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AN  ESSAY 


in 


Practical  Philosophy 


RELATIONS 

of 

WISDOM  and  PURPOSE 


By 
RICHARD  JUSTIN  McCARTY 


1922 


Mis 


Copyright,  1922 
By  RICHARD  JUSTIN  McCARTY 


PRESS  OF   JOS.    O.    HAVENS   CO. 


TO 
THE  ROTARIANS. 

In  appreciation  of  their  faith  in 
the  Wisdom  of  persistent  and  co-oper- 
ative effort,  action  and  service  in  pro- 
motion of  the  general  welfare  of  man- 
kind. 


Compliments   of 

R.  J.  McCARTY 

3820   Warwick  Boulevard 

KANSAS  CITY,  MISSOURI 

ARGUMENT. 


The  nature  and  practical  significance  of 
purposes  and  the  means  and  methods  used  in 
their  prosecution  and  achievement  constitute 
the  only  available  criterion  of  Wisdom. 

Kans£is  City,  Missouri, 
March  1 2,  1 922. 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PURPOSES  OF  MAN. 

Page 

Standard  Definitions  of  Purpose \ 

Conception  of  a  Purpose 2 

Determination  of  a  Purpose 3 

Resolution 3-4 

Object  of  a  Purpose 5 

Accomplishment  of  Object 5-6 

Achievement  of  a  Purpose 6-7 

Subordinate  Purposes 7-8 

Definite  Purpose 8 

Indefinite  Purpose 8 

No  Human  Purpose  Strictly  Definite 9-10 

Classificaton  of  Human  Purposes 10-15 

CHAPTER  II. 

GOOD  AND  EVIL  PURPOSES. 

Pleasure  and  Pain 16-17 

Natural  and  Artficial  Causes 17 

Natural  and  Artificial  Conditions 18-19 

Distinctions  of  Good  and  Evil 20-21 

Human  Welfare 22 

Human  Progress 23 

Sources  of  Human  Progress 24-25 

Avoidance  and  Compensation 26 

Death  Not  a  Natural  Evil 27 

Pain  a  Protection 28 

Basis  of  Distinctions 29 

Justified  by  Scriptures 30-31 

Definition  of  a  Good  Purpose 32 

Definition  of  an  Evil  Purpose 32 


CHAPTER  III. 
PREDOMINANCE  OF  GOOD  PURPOSES. 

Page 

Opinions  of  Good  and  Evil  Variable 33 

Good  Purposes  Prolific 34 

Evil  Purposes  Tend  to  Their  Own  Correction 35 

Good  Purposes  Must  Prevail  Over  Evil 36 

Development  of  Human  Progress 36-38 

Historical  Evidence  of  Predominance  of  Good  Over 

Evil 39-44 

Moral  Evolution    45-46 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CAUSE,  EFFECT  AND  PRINCIPLE. 

Cause,  Effect  and  Event 47 

General  Classification  of  Causes 48 

Definition  of  Elnergy 49 

Classification  of  Energies 49 

Definition  of  Principle 50 

Development  of  Principles  as  Conditions 

Necessary  for  Achievement  of  Purposes.  .  .  .50-58 

Basis  of  Development 51-52 

Principle  of  Causation 53 

Principle   of  Regulation 53 

Principle  of  Stability 54 

Principle  of  Conservation  of  Matter 55 

Principle  of  Correlation  of  Energies 55-57 

Principle  of  Conservation  of  Energies 58 

Testimony  of  Science 59-61 

General  Demonstration  of  Principles 62-64 


n 


CHAPTER  V. 

LAW  AND  ORDER. 

Page 

Conception  of  a  Natural  Law 65 

Classification  of  Laws 65-69 

Conditions  of  a  Law 69-7 1 

Self-enforcement  of  Law 70 

Co-operative  Causes 72-73 

More  than  a  Single  Cause  for  Every 

Conceivable  Effect 72 

Conception  of  Order 73 

Rules  of  Order 74-75 

Number  and  Variety 75 

Practical  Illustration 76-77 

Rules  of  Order  for  Co-operation  of  Men 77 

Sensation 78 

Thought 78 

Emotion 79 

Relations  of  Sensation,  Thought  and 

Emotion 79-80 

Human  Welfare  and  Progress  the  only  Practicable 

Basis  for  Co-operation  of  Men 81 

Law  and  Order 82 

CHAPTER  VI. 

MEANS  AND  METHOD. 

Definition  of  Means 83 

Summary  of  Available  Means 83 

Definition  of  Method 84 

General  Method  of  Achievement 85 

Practical  Examples  of  Method 86-88 

Metaphysical  Conception  of  Method 89-90 

Modification  of  Means  and  Method 90-92 

Resources  Available  to  Man 93-94 


III 


CHAPTE,R  VII. 

INTELLECTUAL  EFFICIENCY. 

Page 

Conception  of  Intellectual  Efficiency 95 

Criterion  of  Intellectual  Efficiency 95 

Intellectual  Qualifications 96-1  1  3 

-^-_xy  Spirit 97-104 

^r^^Knowledge ,.,..., 104-108 

\     Discretion 1  09- 1  1  0 

Spirit,   Knowledge  and  Discretion ...  1  1  1  - 1  1  2 
General  Definition  of  Intellectual  Efficiency 113 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

FORMS  OF  INTELLECTUAL  EFFICIENCY. 

Theoretical  Ability 114-118 

Speculative  Ability 115 

Mathematical  Ability 115 

Elxperimental  Ability 115 

Practical  Ability 116-127 

Dexterity 117-119 

Development 117-118 

Limitations 118-119 

Skill 119-122 

Development 120-121 

Limitations 121-122 

Executive  Ability 122-127 

Development 123-125 

Degrees  of  Executive  Ability 125-127 

Efficiency  of  Executive  Ability  Depends  upon  the 

Practical  Significance  of  Free  Will 127 


IV 


CHAPTER  IX. 

FREE  WILL  AND  EXECUTIVE  ABIUTY. 

Page 

Doctrine  of  Free  Will  .  . 128 

Opposite  Doctrine 128 

Doctrine  of  Free  Will  can  be  neither  Proved 

nor    Disproved 1  29- 1  32 

Apparent  Absence  of  Free  Will  may  be  Caused 

by  an  Act  of  Free  Will  Itself 1  32 

Relations  of  Free  Will  to  Executive  Ability 1  33-1  35 

Predominance    of   Good    Purposes   Indicates 

that,  in  Practice,  Man  is  not  entirely  a 

Free  Agent 135 

Basis  of  Executive  Ability 1  36-1  38 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  WISDOM  OF  MAN. 

Wisdom,  the  Name  of  Intellectual  Excellence 1  39 

Method  of  Reaching  a  Conception  of  Wisdom 1  39-140 

Different  Conceptions  of  Wisdom 140-145 

Metaphysical  Conception  of  Intellectual 

Excellence 1  46-1  47 

Definitions  of  W^isdom  Given  in  Standard 

Dictionaries 1  48-1  50 

General  Conception  of  Wisdom  here  Reached 150 

Wisdom  Implicitly  Defined 151 

Wisdom  Involves  Intellectual  Efficiency 151 

Judgment 1  52-1  53 

Virtue 154 

Explicit  Definition  of  Wisdom 155 


CHAPTER  XL 
DEGREES  OF  HUMAN  WISDOM. 

Page 
Pleasure  in  Pursuit  of  Knowledge  often  Detrimental 

to  Wisdom  of  Individual 1  56-1  60 

Improves  Wisdom,  as  a  Whole ]  60-1  61 

^^  Wisdorai  and  Knowledge 1  61  -1  62 

Wisdom  and  Discretion 1  62-1  63 

Wisdom  and  Judgment 1  63-1  64 

Wisdom  and  Virtua-._ 1  65 

Individual  Wisdom  not  Extensive 1  66 

Collective  Wisdom  Extensive 1  66-1  67 

Degrees  of  Individual  Wisdom 168-1  72 

Highest  Degree  of  Human  Wisdom 177 


CHAPTER  XII. 
UNLIMITED  WISDOM. 

Scriptural  Conception  of  The  Absolute  Cause 1  74-1  75 

Divine  and  Human  Wisdom  the  Same  in  Kind 1  75 

Consequences  of  Unlimited  Wisdom 1  76-1  79 

A  Single  Definite  Purpose,  Illimitably  Good  and 

Great 177 

Greatest  Scope  of  Self-enforcing  Law  and 

Order 177-178 

Original  Crudity  of  All  Existing  Things 1  78 

Accordance  With  Phenomena  of  Existence.  ...  1  79-184 
Relations  of  Wisdom  to  Purpose  and  to  Law  and 

Order 184-188 

Beneficial  Consequences 1  88-1  89 

General  Conclusion 190 


VI 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  PURPOSES  OF  MAN. 

A  Purpose,  according  to  recognized  au- 
thorities is: 

An  idea  or  ideal  kept  before 
the  mind  as  an  end  or  aim  of  effort 
or  action. 

According    to    these    same    authorities    a 

purpose  may  also  be  regarded  as: 

\  A  resolution  to  attain  to  an  end 

or  aim. 

While  these  definitions  apparently  relate 
to  different  things  they  really  represent  diflFer- 
ent  aspects  of  the  same  thing  because  an  end 
or  aim  must  involve  a  resolution  and  a  resolu- 
tion always  involves  an  end  or  aim. 

For  this  reason  either  definition  is  ac- 
ceptable under  certain  conditions  and  accord- 
ing to  the  point  of  view. 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  this  treatise,  however,  the  term  Pur- 
pose is  used  in  the  comprehensive  sense  ex- 
pressed by  the  proposition  that: 

A  purpose  is  determined  in  the 
mind  whenever  a  resolution  is  made 
to  attain  to  an  end  or  aim. 

Since  attainment  to  an  end  or  aim  re- 
quires action  and  since  action  can  be  recog- 
nized only  through  its  effect  every  end  or  aim 
may  be  regarded  as  the  final  effect  of  intended 
action. 

Therefore,  the  significance  of  the  term 
Purpose  as  used  in  this  treatise  may  be  more 
explicitly  stated  by  means  of  the  proposi- 
tion : 

Whenever  a  man  resolves  to 
bring  about  or  cause  to  be  brought 
about  any  mental  or  physical  effect 
there  is  determined  in  the  mind  of 
that  man  what  is  known  as  a  pur- 
pose. 


DETERMINATION  OF  A  PURPOSE. 

The  determination  of  a  purpose  in  the 
mind  consists  of  reaching  a  conception  of  the 
final  intended  effect  and  of  forming  a  resolu- 
tion to  produce  it  or  to  cause  it  to  be  produced. 
The  conception  may  be  definite,  as  in  the  case 
of  a  proposed  building  for  which  plans  and 
specifications  have  been  prepared;  or  it  may 
be  indefinite  as,  for  instance,  when  it  relates 
exclusively  to  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  or 
w^hen  a  person  tries  to  escape  from  some  dis- 
agreeable or  dangerous  situation  without  re- 
gard to  any  other  consequences  of  his  or  her 
action.  But  in  every  case  there  must  be  some 
kind  of  a  conception  in  order  that  a  resolution 
may  be  possible. 

The  resolution  to  produce  the  final  in- 
tended effect  must  be  such  as  to  insure  action, 
for  otherwise  there  would  exist  in  the  mind 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

nothing  more  than  a  vague  inclination  which 
might  be  entirely  without  practical  signifi- 
cance. Also,  the  resolution  must  insure  im- 
mediate action  because  if  not  then  it  might  be 
merely  an  intention  and  be  subsequently  aban- 
doned, making  it  equivalent  to  an  inclination. 
Again,  the  resolution  must  insure  persist- 
ent although  not  necessarily  continuous  action 
tow^ards  the  intended  effect  for  otherwise  it 
might  be  given  up  after  action  had  been  taken 
and  solely  because  that  action  had  been  based 
not  on  a  resolution  but  on  an  inclination.  On 
the  other  hand  every  resolution,  howsoever 
complete,  must  yield  when  it  becomes  known 
that  the  intended  effect  cannot  be  produced. 
Thus,  abandonment  of  effort  or  action  does 
not  always  indicate  a  want  of  original  resolu- 
tion. 


RESOLUTION  AND  OBJECT. 

Therefore,  it  would  seem  that  the  only 
acceptable  evidence  of  a  resolution  is  persist- 
ent effort  or  action  in  the  direction  of  the  in- 
tended effect  until  all  the  operations  shall  have 
been  completed  and  the  final  result  deter- 
mined. 

The  object  of  a  purpose  is  the  final  in- 
tended effect.  Experience  shows  that  in  the 
end  it  often  does  not  correspond  to  the  orig- 
inal conception  upon  which  the  resolution  may 
have  been  based.  Sometimes  this  is  because 
the  original  conception  had  not  been  exact 
and  sometimes  it  is  because  the  precise  effect 
w^as  not  found  to  be  practicable. 

Accomplishment  of  the  object  is  the  pro- 
duction of  the  final  intended  effect  or  its  prac- 
tical equivalent.  Unintentional  production  of 
an  effect  considered  in  relation  to  the  mind  of 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  person  by  whom  it  was  produced  is  not 
equivalent  to  accomplishment  of  an  object  be- 
cause in  such  a  case  there  would  be  no  resolu- 
tion and,  therefore,  no  purpose.  Experience 
shows  that  accomplishment  of  an  object  usu- 
ally begins  after  the  formation  of  the  purpose 
in  the  mind  but  that  in  many  cases  certain  work 
necessary  for  the  determination  of  the  purpose 
may  be  used  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  ob- 
ject; as,  for  instance,  surveys,  plans  and  spec- 
ifications made  with  a  view  to  ascertaining, 
whether  a  railroad  or  other  structure  shall  be 
built. 

As  is  well  known,  the  accomplishment  of 
the  object  need  not  always  be  prosecuted  or 
completed  by  the  person  with  whom  the  pur-^ 
pose  may  have  originated. 

The  achievement  of  a  purpose  consists  of 


ACHIEVEMENT  OF  PURPOSE. 

the  performance  of  all  mental  and  physical 
operations  necessary  to  determine  the  purpose 
in  the  mind  and  to  accomplish  the  object. 

Since  certain  purposes  may  be  determin- 
ed in  the  mind  of  one  person  and  their  objects 
accomplished  by  others,  achievement  of  a  pur- 
pose may  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  two  dis- 
tinct although  closely  related  operations. 

Experience  proves  that  the  achievement 
of  a  purpose  often  requires  the  production  of 
several  subordinate  effects  and  that  each  of 
these  effects  is  or  may  be  regarded  as  the  ob- 
ject of  a  subordinate  purpose. 

Also,  experience  shows  that,  as  a  rule, 
subordinate  purposes  may  be  achieved  by  dif- 
ferent persons  co-operating  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  bring  about  the  final  intended  effect  of 
the  general  purpose  with  much  more  expedi- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  and  efficiency  than  would  otherwise  be 
possible.  This  means,  of  course,  that  the  gen- 
eral purpose  is,  in  effect,  a  combination  of  all 
those  which  may  be  subordinate  to  it. 

Too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  given  to 
the  importance  of  the  condition  here  involved 
because,  without  it,  all  purposes  of  great  and 
enduring  benefit  wrhich  require  co-operation 
of  a  number  of  men  would  be  impracticable; 
also,  because  although  the  condition  is  general- 
ly wrell-known  its  importance  in  practice  is 
often  far  from  being  fully  appreciated. 

A  definite  purpose  is  one  that  has  a  clear- 
ly defined  object  which  is  known  to  be  prac- 
ticable and  is  certain  to  be  accomplished. 

An  indefinite  purpose  either  has  an  in- 
definite object  or  is  determined  in  the  mind 
without  knowledge  that  the  object  is  practica- 
ble. 


DEFINITE  PURPOSES. 

To  be  able  to  achieve  a  definite  purpose 
it  is  evident  that  a  man  must  have  decision  of 
character,  clearness  of  conception,  foreknowl- 
edge of  future  conditions  and  ability  to  ac- 
quire, adapt  and  apply  suitable  means  with 
precision  as  against  every  influence  which 
might  otherw^ise  defeat  the  purpose. 

Now,  there  are  many  men  of  great  deci- 
sion; some  are  so  from  ignorance,  some  are 
regarded  as  eccentric  and  others  are  recog- 
nized as  men  of  common  sense,  talent  or  gen- 
ius, each  according  to  his  achievements  and  to 
the  mental  attitude  of  those  who  may  indulge 
their  propensity  to  judge.  But  decision  does 
not  insure  achievement  for,  in  addition  to  re- 
strictions of  environment,  every  man  wants 
foreknowledge  and  lacks  precision,  so  that  his 
best  results  are  generally  mere  approxima- 
tions. 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore,  every  human  purpose  may  be 
regarded  as  more  or  less  indefinite. 

The  purposes  of  man  may  be  classified 
generally  with  respect  to  their  objects  as  the- 
oretical and  practical. 

TTieoretical  purposes  are  those  which 
have  for  their  objects  the  acquisition,  promul- 
gation and  inculcation  of  knowledge  vsrithout 
definite  regard  to  its  immediate  practical  ap- 
plication. 

A  theoretical  purpose  may  be  specula- 
tive, mathematical  or  experimental. 

A  speculative  purpose  is  one  that  is  con- 
fined to  study,  thought  and  instruction  con- 
cerning the  phenomena  of  the  intellect  and  its 
relations  to  cause  and  effect. 

A  mathematical  purpose  relates  exclu- 
sively to  knowledge  of  fact  and  truth  concern- 


10 


EXPERIMENTAL  PURPOSES. 

ing  the  relations  of  magnitude  and  quantity. 

An  experimental  purpose  is  one  that  re- 
lates to  the  development  of  fact  and  truth  by- 
experiment  and  may  have  for  its  object  either 
the  discovery  of  the  cause  or  causes  which,  un- 
der certain  conditions,  may  be  required  to  pro- 
duce a  certain  effect  or  the  ascertainment  of 
the  effect  which  a  certain  cause  or  certain 
causes,  w^hen  placed  under  given  conditions, 
may  be  depended  upon  to  produce. 

Now,  the  practical  importance  of  a  dis- 
covery that  certain  causes  placed  under  cer- 
tain conditions  will  bring  about  a  certain  ef- 
fect depends  upon  the  conditions  as  well  as 
upon  the  causes,  for  unless  similar  conditions 
obtain,  the  same  effect  may  not  be  produced. 
Also,  it  is  well  known  that  the  same  effect  may 
often  be  brought  about  by  different  causes  un- 


11 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

der  different  conditions.  Consequently,  since 
the  practical  importance  of  experimental  pur- 
poses is  often  problematical  they  are  here 
treated  as  theoretical. 

Practical  purposes  are  those  which  have 
for  their  general  object  the  production  of  a 
definite  effect  upon  the  practical  affairs  of  life. 

A  practical  purpose  may  be  intuitive, 
empirical  or  tentative. 

An  intuitive  purpose  is  one  that  seems 
to  spring  from  impulse  and  to  be  completed  by 
instinctive  processes.  As  so  understood, 
many  if  not  all  intuitive  purposes  correspond 
closely  if  not  exactly  to  those  indicated  by  the 
activities  of  certain  of  the  lower  animals. 

An  empirical  purpose  is  that  which  re- 
quires appreciable  mental  effort  for  its 
achievement  and  which  is  known  to  be  similar 


12 


TENTATIVE  PURPOSES. 

to  some  purpose  previously  achieved  auid 
which  can  be  repeated  under  present  condi- 
tions. These  are  understood  to  include  all  the 
ordinary  recurrent  purposes  of  life  that  are  not 
intuitive. 

A  tentative  purpose  is  one  that  has  for 
its  object  either  an  effect  that  is  not  known 
to  have  been  produced  before  or  the  more  effi- 
cient achievement  of  a  previous  purpose. 

Tentative  purposes  are  often  undertaken 
writh  inadequate  or  false  notions  of  probable 
or  possible  results.  They  thus  include  those 
which  fail  from  an  improper  selection  of 
means,  those  which  miscarry  from  an  ineffi- 
cient use  of  suitable  means  and  those  which 
cannot  be  achieved  by  any  means  whatever. 
Far  be  it,  however,  that  he  who  prosecutes 
such  purposes  should  be  disparaged,  for  he  it 


13 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  whose  enterprising  spirit  often  causes  him 
to  blunder  on  fact  and  truth,  succeed  beyond 
all  expectation  and  become  an  excellent  ex- 
ample of  what  a  great  man  judged  by  his 
works  might  be.  In  addition  to  this  even  those 
tentative  purposes  that  fail  or  miscarry  always 
tend  to  increase  the  store  of  practical  experi- 
ence. 

Therefore,  as  is  otherwise  well  know^n, 
tentative  purposes,  regardless  of  success  or 
failure,  constitute  a  great  source  of  industrial 
and  social  progress. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  under  the  defi- 
nitions given,  the  difference  between  an  ex- 
perimental purpose  and  a  tentative  purpose  is 
that  the  former  is  achieved  for  sake  of  knowl- 
edge alone  while  the  latter  is  prosecuted  and 
completed  for  sake  of  its  practical  effect. 


14 


GREAT  PURPOSES. 

A  purpose  is  generally  considered  great 
according  to  the  number  and  importance  of 
the  subordinate  purposes  which  are  merged 
into  the  accomplishment  of  the  final  object. 

A  purpose  is  also  recognized  as  great  in 
proportion  to  the  immediate  and  to  the  ulti- 
mate consequences  of  its  achievement. 


15 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  11. 

GOOD  AND  EVIL  PURPOSES. 

It  is  natural  for  men  to  base  distinctions 
of  good  and  evil  upon  sensations  and  emotions 
of  immediate  pleasure  and  pain  rather  than 
upon  the  remote  consequences  of  the  conduct 
or  action  that  may  result  from  those  feelings. 

This  tendency  is  shown  by  the  philos- 
opher ThomEis  Hobbes  in  the  statement  that: 

* 'Every  man  calleth  that  which 
pleaseth,  and  is  delightful  to  him- 
self, good:  and  that  evil  which  dis- 
pleaseth  him." 

The    celebrated    philosopher    John    Locke 

expressed  himself  similarly  thus: 

* 'Things  then  are  good  or  evil 

only   in   reference   to    pleasure   or 

•    ft 
pam. 

The   same   tendency   is   indicated   by   the 

16 


GOOD  AND  EVIL  PURPOSES. 

standard    dictionaries,    according    to   which: 

Good  is: 

* 'Adapted  to  give  or  giving 
pleasure.'* 

Also:  * 'Having  qualities  adapted  to  pro- 
duce some  kind  of  satisfaction, 
whether  physical,  mental  or  moral." 

Evil  is: 

* 'Producing  or  threatening 
pain,  sorrow,  distress,  injury  or 
calamity." 

Also:  Possessing  injurious  nature  or 
qualities;  unwholesome;  hurtful 
hostile  to  the  welfare  of  any  crea- 
ture.'* 

A  sensation  of  pleasure  or  of  pain  is  an 
effect  of  a  certain  cause  upon  a  certain  person 
under  certain  conditions. 

A  cause  is  understood  to  be  natural  when 
free  from  the  influence  of  human  control;  and 
to  be  artificial  when  and  to  the  degree  it  is 
subjected  to  such  influence. 

17 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  condition  is  regarded  as  natural  when 
it  has  been  brought  about  in  the  natural  course 
of  events  unchanged  by  human  interference, 
and  as  artificial  to  the  extent  that  it  has  been 
affected  by  the  conduct  of  man. 

Experience  sho-ws  that  under  different 
natural  conditions  the  same  cause  may  give 
the  same  man  pleasure  at  one  time  and  pain 
at  another.   For  illustration: 

Fire  sometimes  gives  pleasure  and  some- 
times pain,  according  to  natural  conditions 
and  the  same  is  true  of  air,  of  v/ater,  of  the 
earth  and,  consequently,  of  the  causes  they 
involve.  This  being  true,  it  appears  that 
every  natural  cause  by  which  a  man  may  be 
affected  might,  under  the  definitions  given, 
sometimes  be  good  and  sometimes  evil  while 
the  cause  itself  would  remain  unchanged. 
Again,   the  same   natural  causes   under  the 

18 


PLEASURE  AND  PAIN. 

same  natural  conditions  may  sometimes  af- 
ford pleasure  and  sometimes  give  pain  to  the 
same  man  according  to  his  conduct  with  re- 
spect to  those  causes  and  conditions. 

But  it  is  manifest  that  contrary  epithets 
cannot,  without  qualification,  be  properly 
applied  at  different  times  to  a  thing  that  has 
not  undergone  a  change. 

Therefore,  definite  distinctions  of  good 
and  evil  cannot  apply  to  natural  causes  or  to 
natural  conditions. 

It  is  well  known,  however,  that  the  same 
man  will  experience  the  same  sensation  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain  as  often  as  he  places  him- 
self in  the  same  relations  to  certain  natural  or 
artificial  causes  and  conditions;  also  that  the 
sensation  can  be  depended  upon  to  vary  in 
regular  accordance  with  any  change  he  may 
make  in  those  relations. 

19 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Now,  in  so  far  as  the  relations  of  a  man 
to  any  natural  cause  are  not  controlled  by  him 
they  may  be  regarded  as  natural  conditions, 
and  to  the  extent  that  those  relations  are  under 
his  control  his  sensations  of  pleasure  and  of 
pain  are  determined  by  his  own  action. 

Therefore,  distinctions  of  good  and  evil 
must  be  established  w^ith  especial  reference  to 
human  conduct. 

Now,  human  conduct  may  give  pleasure 
which  is  followed  as  a  consequence  by  compar- 
atively greater  pain,  such,  for  instance,  as  dis- 
sipation, and  it  is  clear  that  this  should  not  be 
recognized  as  good.  On  the  other  hand, 
human  conduct  may  give  immediate  pain 
succeeded  by  proportionately  greater  pleas- 
ure, as,  for  example,  hard  and  honest  labor, 
and  it  is  manifest  that  this  should  not  be  re- 
garded as  evil. 

20 


WELFARE  AND  PROGRESS. 

Consequently,  immediate  pleasure  and 
immediate  pain  resulting  from  human  conduct 
are  not  sufficient  as  a  general  basis  for  dis- 
tinctions of  good  and  evil. 

This  condition,  however,  may  be  met  by 
basing  all  distinctions  of  good  and  evil  upon 
human  conduct  considered  with  respect  to  its 
effect  upon  the  ultimate  welfare  and  progress 
of  man.  For,  it  is  evident  that  to  the  extent 
human  conduct  contributes  in  the  end  to  hu- 
man welfare  and  progress  it  must  be  recog- 
nized as  good  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  detrimental 
to  the  ultimate  welfare  and  progress  of  man  it 
must  be  regarded  as  evil. 

Therefore,  all  distinctions  of  good  and 
evil  should  be  made  with  particular  reference 
to  the  influence  of  human  conduct  upon  the 
ultimate  welfare  and  progress  of  mankind. 

21 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Human    welfare,    according    to    standard 

authority,  is: 

''State  or  condition  in  regard 
to  well-being;  especially  condition 
of  health,  happiness,  prosperity 
and  the  like;  negatively,  exemp- 
tion from  evil  or  calamity." 

This  includes  both  physical  and  intellec- 
tual welfare  and  is  understood  to  mean  that: 

Physical  w^elfare  is  that  state  which 
makes  it  practicable  to  procure  adequate 
safety,  sufficient  food  and  suitable  comfort: 
and  that: 

Intellectual  welfare  is  that  condition  of 
knowledge,  intellectual  ability,  mental  dis- 
cipline and  refinement  in  which  the  mind  is 
undisturbed  by  fear  or  suffering,  is  able  to 
resist  temptation,  control  passion,  banish  pre- 
judice, is  qualified  to  achieve  purposes  and  is 
not  misled  by  any  false  theories  or  impracti- 
cable ideals. 

22 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  MAN. 

Human  progress,  as  defined  by  accepted 
authority,  is: 

* 'Advance  in  physical,  mental 
or  moral  development,  condition  or 
position." 

In  vievvr  of  the  definition  of  welfare  this 
is  understood  to  mean  that: 

Physical  progress  is  advance  in  physical 
welfare  or  in  the  conditions  affecting  safety, 
food  and  comfort;  and  that: 

Intellectual  progress  is  advance  in  intel- 
lectual welfare  or  in  knowledge,  intellectual 
ability,  mental  discipline  and  refinement. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  betw^een  the 
first  appearance  of  man  on  earth  and  the  pres- 
ent time  there  has  been  some  human  progress. 
For  to  deny  this  w^ould  be  to  deny  the  validity 
of  every  recognized  standard  of  physical, 
social,  moral,  intellectual  and  spiritual  ex- 
cellence. 

23 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  progress  could  have  been  due  only 
to  natural  causes,  to  the  activities  of  man  or 
to  both. 

This  condition  is  w^ell  expressed  by  the 
philosophic  historian  Buckle  as  follows: 

**Thus  we  have  man  modifying 
nature,  and  nature  modifying  man; 
while  out  of  this  reciprocal  action  all 
events  must  spring/* 

The  exact  extent  to  which  the  progress 
of  man  to  date  has  been  brought  about  by  nat- 
ural causes  is,  of  course,  problematical  but  it 
w^ould  not  seem  to  exceed  the  natural  progress 
of  the  present  savage  who  has  always  depend- 
ed most  upon  natural  causes  and  least  upon  his 
own  activities.  Consequently,  if  from  the 
total  progress  of  this  savage  there  could  be 
deducted  that  brought  about  by  the  efforts  he 
has  been  compelled  to  make  in  advancement 

24 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  MAN. 

of  his  welfare  there  would  remain  the  total 
progress  of  man  resulting  from  natural  causes 
to  date.  This,  according  to  the  best  available 
data,  would  be  practically  the  natural  progress 
of  the  highest  of  the  lower  animals;  and  this 
may  be  disregarded  because,  evidently,  it  is 
only  the  progress  w^hich  has  raised  man  above 
the  beast  that  need  be  considered. 

Therefore,  natural  causes  except  to  the 
extent  that  they  were  used  as  means,  have, 
contributed  practically  nothing  to  the  advance- 
ment of  human  welfare. 

Whence  the  proposition  that: 

The  progress  of  man  originates 
in  and  is  determined  by  his  own  con- 
duct. 

This  w^as  expressed  by  Buckle  thus: 

**TTie  only  progress  which  is 
really  effective  depends  not  upon 
the  bounty  of  nature  but  upon  the 
energy  of  man.*' 

25 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

For  sake  of  completeness  it  is  proper  to 
enquire  whether  natural  causes  are  detrimen- 
tal to  human  progress. 

Experience  shows  that  natural  causes 
which  men  constantly  fear,  such  as  those  tend- 
ing to  produce  disease  and  want,  may  often  be 
turned  to  permanent  advantage  by  the  exercise 
of  prudence,  industry  and  thrift.  Those  which 
men  dread  but  cannot  or  do  not  avoid  seldom 
equal  the  serious  apprehensions  of  the  sufferer. 
Natural  causes  from  which  men  suffer  short 
of  death  may,  as  a  rule,  be  overcome  by  cour- 
age, fortitude  and  the  proper  use  of  the  means 
that  may  be  at  command;  and  even  though 
this  may  involve  great  effort,  pain  and  depri- 
vation it  results  in  progress  because  it  leaves 
those  who  are  affected  better  and  abler  than 
before  and  in  addition  gives  to  them  that  pre- 
eminent satisfaction  afforded  by  the  conscious- 

26 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  MAN. 

ness  of  dangers  past  and  labors  well  perform- 
ed. Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  the  slightest 
conclusive  evidence  that  causes  which  are  be- 
yond control  of  man  have  ever  been  really  in- 
imical to  his  ultimate  welfare  and  progress. 
On  the  contrary,  natural  causes  whose  pain- 
ful effects  cannot  be  avoided  by  human  agency 
are  often  made  tolerable  if  not  beneficial  by 
the  natural  laws  of  physical  and  mental  adap- 
tation. These  failing,  the  natural  result  is 
death. 

But  it  is  certain  that  in  common  with 
plants  and  the  lower  animals  men  must  die 
in  order  that  their  posterity  may  prosper  and 
progress,  so  that,  if  judged  by  the  greatest 
good  to  the  greatest  number,  which  is  the  only 
available  criterion,  it  must  be  conceded  that 
even  death,  as  the  result  of  natural  causes,  is 
not  an  evil. 

27 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  addition  to  this,  were  it  not  for  the  sen- 
sations and  emotions  of  pain  there  would  be 
nothing  to  w^arn  men  of  immediate  danger  and 
thus  prevent  them  from  blindly  contributing 
to  their  own  destruction. 

In  this  connection  the  philosopher  John 
Locke  states  that: 

*'Thus  heat,  that  is  very  agree- 
able to  us  in  one  degree,  by  a  little 
increase  of  it,  proves  no  ordinary 
torment;  and  the  most  pleasant  of 
all  sensible  objects,  light  itself,  if 
there  be  too  much  of  it,  if  increased 
beyond  a  due  proportion  to  our  eyes, 
causes  a  very  painful  sensation; 
which  is  wisely  and  favorably  so  or- 
dered by  nature,  that  when  any  ob- 
ject does  by  the  vehemency  of  its  op- 
eration disorder  the  instruments  of 
sensation,  whose  structure  cannot 
but  be  very  nice  and  delicate,  we 
might,  by  the  pain,  be  warned  to 
withdraw  before  the  organ  be  quite 
put  out  of  order,  and  be  so  unfitted 
for  its  proper  function  for  the  fu- 
ture.** 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  MAN. 

These  considerations  indicate  that  nat- 
ural causes  subject  to  the  control  of  man  may 
be  made  to  contribute  either  directly  or  in- 
directly to  his  ultimate  welfare  and  progress 
and  that  causes  not  subject  to  human  control 
naturally  conserve  if  they  do  not  contribute 
to  that  end. 

Therefore,  natural  causes  are  not  essen- 
tially detrimental  to  human  progress. 

Whence  it  appears,  that  natural  causes, 
by  and  of  themselves,  tend  neither  to  improve 
nor  to  impair  the  progress  of  man. 

This  means  that  the  effects  of  natural 
causes  upon  human  progress  are  determined 
solely  by  the  conduct  of  man  and  from  this 
there  follows  the  proposition  that: 

The  conduct  of  man  considered 
in  relation  to  its  ultimate  effect  upon 
human  progress  is  the  only  proper 
basis  for  adequate  distinctions  of 
good  and  evil. 

29 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  same  proposition  is  taught  at  least 
by  implication  in  the  Book  of  Genesis  where 
it  is  written  that: 

"And  out  of  the  ground  made 
the  LORD  God  to  grow^  every  tree 
that  is  pleasant  to  the  sight,  and 
good  for  food;  the  tree  of  Hfe  also  in 
the  midst  of  the  garden,  and  the  tree 
of  know^ledge  of  good  and  evil." 

''And  the  LORD  God  com- 
manded the  man,  saying,  Of  every 
tree  of  the  garden  thou  mayest  free- 
ly eat: 

But  of  the  tree  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  good  and  evil,  thou  shalt  not 
eat  of  it;  for  in  the  day  that  thou  eat- 
est  thereof  thou  shalt  surely  die." 

It  is  also  written  that  man  ate  of  the  for- 
bidden fruit  and  thus  gained  a  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil. 

This  must  mean  that  man  was  not  con- 
scious of  any  distinctions  of  good  and  evil  un- 
til he  had  become  active  in  the  pursuit  of  things 
not  provided  by  the  bounty  of  nature. 

30 


ADAM  AND  EVE. 

Interpreted  less  abstractly  the  conduct  of 
Adam  and  Eve  in  the  garden  of  Eden  means 
that  they  had  been  moved  or  tempted  by  a 
spirit  which  prompted  escape  from  the  ennui 
of  a  purposeless  existence: 

In  this  connection  Thoreau  stated. 

* 'Undoubtedly  the  very  tedium 
and  ennui  which  presume  to  have 
exhausted  the  variety  and  the  joys 
of  life  are  as  old  as  Adam." 

Also,   concerning  this  same  condition  the 

theologian  J.  F.  Clarke  expressed  himself  as 

follows: 

"The  dreadful  disease  of  ennui, 
of  life-weariness,  attacks  all  who 
have  no  aim,  no  permanent  pur- 
pose." 

Now,  to  the  spirit  that  prompted  Adam 
and  Eve  to  escape  from  the  ennui  of  their  orig- 
inal condition  men  have  always  been  prone 
to  attribute  all  evils  which  have  befallen  them. 

31 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

This,  manifestly,  is  equivalent  to  a  gen- 
eral recognition  of  the  condition  that  man  could 
not  have  been  conscious  of  any  distinctions  of 
good  and  evil  except  through  the  action  he 
had  taken  to  advance  his  welfare. 

Since  distinctions  of  good  and  evil  must 
be  based  on  human  conduct  they  naturally 
apply  to  the  purposes  of  man.  Accordingly, 
it  is  here  understood  that: 

A  good  purpose  is  one  that  conserves  or 
promotes  the  ultimate  w^elf are  and  progress  of 
mankind. 

An  evil  purpose,  being  the  opposite  of 
good,  is  one  that  is  detrimental  to  human  wel- 
fare and  progress. 

Every  purpose  that  is  not  evil  may  fairly 
be  considered  good  because,  if  not  injurious, 
it  must  at  least  conserve  the  welfare  and  prog- 
ress of  man  or  be  without  practical  signify- 
icance. 

82 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  III. 

PREDOMINANCE  OF  GOOD  PURPOSES. 

In  the  course  of  human  events,  what  con- 
stitutes a  good  or  an  evil  purpose  is  generally 
a  matter  of  opinion  based  on  sensations  and 
emotions  produced  by  immediate  or  impend- 
ing pleasure  or  pain  and  subject  to  serious 
change  in  the  increasing  light  of  experience. 

But  even  though  this  is  the  general  rule 
it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  purposes  of 
man  when  considered  in  relation  to  his  gen- 
eral welfare  and  progress  are  subject  to  certain 
fundamental  conditions  which  may  be  devel- 
oped from  observation,  experience,  science 
and  history  in  the  following  manner: 

33 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  achievement  of  a  good  purpose  and 
particularly  one  that  tends  to  the  immediate 
promotion  of  human  welfare  and  progress 
naturally  creates,  as  is  well  know^n,  not  only  a 
desire  to  repeat  it  but  also  a  disposition  to 
achieve  other  purposes  of  the  same  general 
character. 

This  is  recognized  by  St.  Matthew  in  the 

passage: 

*  *Even  so  every  good  tree  bring- 
eth  forth  good  fruit." 

The  same  tendency  of  good  purposes  is 
also  beautifully  expressed  by  the  eminent  di- 
vine G.  P.  Fisher  thus: 

"One  must  be  good  in  order  to 
to  do  good;  but  it  is  a  case  where  the 
fountain  is  deepened  by  the  outflow 
of  its  waters." 

Whence  the  ethical  proposition: 

Good  purposes,  by  reason  of 
their  satisfactory  consequences,  are 
persistent  and  prolific. 

34 


CORRECTION  OF  EVIL. 

Again,  although  men  may  and  do  yield 
to  temptation  it  is  well  known  that  every 
normal  man  is  instinctively  opposed  to  what- 
ever violates  his  natural  sense  of  justice  and  to 
whatever  he  thinks  is  inimical  to  his  welfare 
and  progress.  And  this  is  especially  the  case 
whenever  his  interests  are  threatened  or  in- 
vaded by  the  purposes  of  other  men.  Thus  it 
is  that  evil  purposes  tend  to  create  counter  pur- 
poses which  latter  being  opposed  to  evil  are 
entitled  to  be  considered  good. 

Whence  the  ethical  proposition: 

Evil  purposes,  by  reason  of 
their  unsatisfactory  consequences, 
tend  to  bring  about  their  own  cor- 
rection. 

Now,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  ef- 
fective progress  w^hich  man  has  made  to  date 
could  not  have  been  attained  without  the  pre- 
dominance of  his  good  purposes. 

35 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  predominance  is  recognized  by  Sol- 
omon in  the  Proverb: 

**The  evil  bow  before  the  good; 
and  the  wricked  at  the  gates  of  the 
righteous." 

From    these    considerations    and    since    in 

all  such  matters  man  must  judge  the  future 

by  the  past  there  may  be  affirmed  the  ethical 

proposition: 

Good  purposes,  taken  as  a 
whole,  must  prevail  in  the  end  over 
all  that  are  evil. 

The  general  process  by  which  man  has 
made  progress  by  virtue  of  this  important  prop- 
osition may  be  indicated  thus: 

Man  being  comparatively  weak,  slow 
and  defenseless  by  nature,  advanced  his  safe- 
ty and  therefore  his  physical  w^elfare  by  the 
invention  and  use  of  weapons.  By  means  of 
various  implements  he  made  improvements  in 
the  quality  of  his  food  and  in  its  preparation; 

36 


COURSE  OF  PROGRESS. 

this  advanced  his  physical  welfare  because  it 
improved  his  sources  of  pleasure  and  contrib- 
uted to  that  general  condition  which,  judged 
by  experience,  makes  his  pow^ers  of  endurance, 
as  a  rule,  greater  than  that  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. Being  naturally  unprotected  man,  by  use 
of  weapons  and  implements,  provided  himself 
with  clothing  and  shelter;  this  advanced  his 
physical  welfare  because  the  inconvenience  of 
those  desirable  things  would  not  be  tolerated 
unless  it  were  more  than  compensated  by  the 
pleasure,  comfort  and  protection  they  aflFord. 

In  addition  to  the  physical  progress  in- 
dicated, man  has  advanced  his  intellectual 
welfare  by  the  acquisition  of  knowledge 
which  alleviates  fear  of  the  unknown  and  en- 
ables him  to  mitigate  his  sufferings;  by  im- 
provement in  mental  discipline  which  gives 
him  better  control  of  his  natural  propensities 

37 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  of  means  for  achievement  of  his  purposes; 
also  by  the  gradual  development  of  those  so- 
cial, moral,  intellectual  and  spiritual  quali- 
ties which  give  refinement  to  his  desires  and 
tastes  and  at  the  same  time  make  more  avail- 
able the  means  for  their  gratification. 

To  develop  the  details  of  this  general 
process  so  as  to  show  the  relations  of  good  and 
evil  purposes  through  long  periods  of  time  is 
one  of  the  most  important  duties  of  the  his- 
torian. 

Until  quite  recently  this  duty  was  per- 
formed as  indicated  by  the  following  quota- 
tion from  the  historian  Buckle: 

*'The  unfortunate  peculiarity 
of  the  history  of  man  is,  that  al- 
though its  separate  parts  have  been 
examined  with  considerable  ability, 
hardly  any  one  has  attempted  to 
combine  them  into  a  whole,  and  as- 
certain the  way  in  which  they  are 
connected  with  each  other." 

38 


HISTORICAL  EVIDENCE. 

And  yet  history  abounds  with  evidence 
of  the  ultimate  predominance  of  good  over 
evil  purposes. 

The  evil  purposes  of  the  enemies  of 
Socrates  which  resulted  in  his  death  gave  to 
the  doctrines  of  that  great  man  an  influence 
that  otherwise  they  would  not  have  obtained. 
And  to  this  influence  is  due  much  of  the  moral 
progress  that  has  since  been  made. 

The  evil  purposes  of  the  money  changers 
who  had  been  driven  from  the  temple,  aided 
by  the  treachery  of  Iscariot  and  abetted  by 
the  wrongful  attitude  of  Pilate,  culminated  in 
the  Crucifixion. 

That  ghastly  and  revolting  episode,  be- 
cause of  the  moral  progress  w^hich  by  that 
time  had  been  made  and  by  reason  of  the  un- 
exampled character  and  conduct  of  the  inno- 
cent victim,  outraged  all  sense  of  natural  jus- 

39 
-4- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tice.  It  thus  gave  to  the  precepts  and  to  the 
example  of  Christ  that  emphasis  without  which 
his  doctrines  could  not  so  benignly  and  so  per- 
sistently have  influenced  the  purposes  of  fu- 
ture generations. 

The  purposes  of  the  Inquisition,  because 
of  the  high  emotions  which  their  cruelty 
aroused  at  the  time  and  afterwards,  had  a 
beneficial  influence  upon  the  later  purposes  of 
men  and,  on  the  w^hole,  have  resulted  in  more 
good  than  evil. 

The  evil  purposes  involved  in  human 
slavery  gave  rise  to  the  counter  purposes  which 
brought  forth  abolition  to  the  benefit  both  of 
master  and  of  man. 

Alcoholic  indulgence,  by  reason  of  its 
bad  effects  and  the  evil  purposes  it  engenders 
continually  tends  to  bring  about  its  own  effect- 
ual prohibition. 

40 


HISTORICAL  EVIDENCE. 

Purposes  for  exploitation  of  savage  races 
generally  open  the  way  to  achievement  of  pur- 
poses by  them  and  by  others  for  their  eventual 
betterment. 

The  evil  purposes  of  oppression  that 
brought  about  the  war  of  the  American  Revo- 
lution and  events  connected  with  that  conflict 
resulted  in  establishment  of  higher  moral 
principles  and  ideals  and,  generally,  in  greater 
progress  than  w^ould  seem  to  have  been  pos- 
sible by  any  other  process  at  the  time. 

Also,  in  other  important  cases  it  is  knowrn 
that  evils  attending  achievement  of  warlike 
purposes  have  been  temporary  while  the  ben- 
efits are  lasting  and  cumulative.  This  is  be- 
cause of  the  training,  discipline,  experience 
and  issues  which  tended  to  enhancement  of 
hardihood,  courage,  efficiency,  self-sacrifice 
and  honor  and  because  of  the  good  influences 

41 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  those  improved  qualities  upon  the  imme- 
diate and  subsequent  purposes  of  man.  And, 
there  is  not,  as  in  the  nature  of  things  there 
cannot  be,  any  conclusive  evidence  that  the 
same  is  not  true  of  every  wrar  that  ever  has 
been  w^aged.  In  addition  to  this  the  fear  of 
aggression  naturally  prompts  improvements 
in  defensive  appliances  and  this  leads  to  more 
efficient  implements  of  industry.  The  desire 
for  aggression  has  the  same  general  effect. 
As  a  result  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
stimulus  of  vvrar  has  contributed  largely  to  in- 
dustrial progress.  And  even  though  appear- 
ances may  be  to  the  contrary  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  in  course  of  time  this  recipro- 
cal improvement  in  armament  and  implement 
will  make  warfare  impracticable  and  thus  give 
to  peaceful  avocations  lasting  benefits  which, 

42 


GENERAL  PROGRESS. 

but  for  war,  would  never  have  been  developed. 

That  the  historical  evidence  cited  indi- 
cates the  general  trend  of  events  in  every  con- 
flict betw^een  good  and  evil  may  readily  be 
shown. 

All  experience  indicates  that  the  general 
effect  of  natural  causes  and  conditions  upon 
the  welfare  and  progress  of  man  depends  upon 
the  use  made  of  them  as  means  for  achieve- 
ment of  human  purposes. 

Therefore,  the  general  welfare  and  prog- 
ress of  man  beyond  that  accorded  by  nature 
to  the  lower  animals  must  be  the  result  of 
human  agency. 

This  means,  in  effect,  that  every  man  as 
an  intelligent  agent  is  what  he  is  because  of 
the  good  and  evil  purposes  of  himself,  of  those 
who  are  with  him  and  of  those  who  have  gone 

48 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

before.  And  it  must  be  conceded  that  the 
good  purposes  of  man,  taken  as  a  whole,  from 
the  beginning  to  the  present  time  have  im- 
proved his  condition  and  his  character  and  ad- 
vanced his  general  welfare  as  against  all  the 
evil  purposes  that  have  ever  been  achieved  and 
in  despite  of  all  adverse  influences  which  may 
have  been  contained  in  his  natural  environ- 
ment. Consequently,  even  though  the  ele- 
ments of  evil,  instead  of  being  limited  to  hu- 
man conduct  as  w^as  show^n,  should  inhere  in 
natural  causes  and  conditions,  it  is  certain  that 
man  has  made  progress. 

Therefore,  those  w^ho  may  not  concede 
that  all  distinctions  of  good  and  evil  must  be 
based  on  human  conduct  must  admit  the  prop- 
osition that: 

Good  things,  as  a  whole,  must 
predominate  all  things  that  are  evil. 

44 


CONFLICT  OF  GOOD  AND  EVIL. 

Concerning    the    conflict    between    good 

and  evil  the  theologian  Dr.  Horace  Bushnell 

thus  expressed  himself: 

**No  state  of  virtue  is  com- 
plete, how^ever  total  the  virtue,  save 
as  it  is  won  by  a  conflict  with  evil." 

The   same   condition   is   described   by  the 

historian  James  Anthony  Froude  thus: 

* 'Great  movements  which  are 
unresisted    flow   violently    on    and  i 

w^aste  themselves  in  extravagance 
and  destruction;  and  revolutions 
which  are  to  mark  a  step  in  the  ad- 
vance of  mankind  need  always  the 
discipline  of  opposition  until  the 
baser  parts  are  beaten  out  of  them.** 

The  doctrine  of  moral  evolution  which 
was  developed  by  the  philosopher  Herbert 
Spencer  may  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  hu- 
man conduct  is  a  process  whereby  man  is 
adapted  to  the  conditions  of  his  environment 
and  that  this  adaptation  is  at  its  best  when  it 

45 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

contributes  most  in  the  end  to  human  welfare 
and  progress;  also,  that  this  process  is  as  nat- 
ural as  the  adaptation  of  vegetable  and  animal 
organisms  to  the  vicissitudes  of  environment. 
This  doctrine  is  manifestly  not  in  con- 
flict with  the  quotations  cited  from  theology 
and  history  and  is  in  entire  agreement  with  all 
that  has  been  developed  concerning  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  good  over  the  evil. 


46 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  IV. 

CAUSE,  EFFECT  AND  PRINCIPLE. 

All  experience  shows  that  achievement 
of  any  purpose  consists  of  the  production  of  an 
intended  effect  by  the  systematic  application 
of  cause. 

All  conceptions  of  cause  and  effect  and 
of  their  relations  to  each  other  are  based  upon 
the  events  of  existence. 

An  event  is  any  kind  of  a  change  in  cor- 
poreal, vital  or  intellectual  existence  which  has 
actually  come  to  pass. 

A  cause  is  anything  which  brings  about 
or  which  has  the  ability  to  bring  about  an 
event. 

An  effect  is  an  event  that  is  know^n  to 
have  been  brought  about  by  some  cause. 

47 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Creation  is  what  would  happen  should  an 

event  come  to  pass  without  being  the  eiff  ect  of 

any  cause  whatever. 

According  to  Protagoras: 

*'Man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things:  of  those  which  are,  that  they 
are;  of  those  w^hich  are  not,  that 
they  are  not." 

This  applied  to  causes  may  be  interpreted 
to  mean  that  only  those  by  which  man  is  or  can 
be  affected  can  be  known  to  him  and  that  no 
others  can  or  need  be  considered.  As  so  un- 
derstood the  quotation,  while  somewhat  para- 
doxical, is  generally  recognized  as  being  true. 

The  only  known  causes  are: 

The  inherent  powers  of  inert 
matter. 

The  properties  of  plants. 

The  faculties  and  propensi- 
ties of  animals. 

The  qualifications  of  intelli- 
gent agents. 

48 


ENERGIES  OF  EXISTENCE 

Energy  is  ability  of  a  cause  to  produce 
effect  and  is  actual  or  potential  according  as 
the  cause  is  or  is  not  in  operation. 

TTie  energies  of  existence  cleissified  with 

respect  to  their  causes  are: 

Corporeal  Energies: 

All  those  resulting  directly 
from  the  intrinsic  properties  of  inert 
matter. 

Vital  Energies: 

All  that  result  directly  from  the 
organization  of  matter  into  a  condi- 
tion of  physical  vitality. 

Intellectual  Energies: 

Those  that  are  due  to  the  es- 
sential qualities  of  the  mind  and 
bring  about  all  mental  processes. 

Trancendental  Energies: 

Those  assumed  to  arise  from 
ideal  qualities  of  real  or  imaginary 
things  in  order  to  account  for  effects 
or  events  otherwise  inexplicable. 

49 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  cause  is  adequate  with  respect  to  a 
change  in  existence  or  an  effect  when  it  has  the 
quality  and  quantity  of  energy  necessary  to 
bring  about  that  change.  The  only  proper  test 
of  the  adequacy  of  the  cause  is  the  production 
of  the  effect. 

A  Principle  is  here  treated  as  a  general 
natural  regulation  without  which  systematic 
application  of  causes  to  achievement  of  pur- 
poses would  be  impracticable. 

The  general  principles  necessary  for 
achievement  of  the  purposes  of  man  may  be 
developed  as  follows: 

TTie  inherent  powers  of  inert  matter, 
properties  of  plants,  faculties  and  propensities 
of  animals  and  qualifications  of  intelligent 
agents  are  all  known  by  experience  to  be  effi- 
cient causes,  each  able  to  influence  causes  of 
its  own  as  w^ell  as  of  every  other  class.  Thus 
it  is  that,  as  is  well  known,  the  systematic  ap- 

50 


CONDITIONS  OF  ACHIEVEMENT, 

plication  of  any  given  cause  makes  it  necessary 
to  consider  not  only  the  given  cause  but  also 
its  relations  to  every  other  cause  of  the  same 
or  of  a  different  class. 

For  convenience  of  reference  the  well 
knovyrn  conditions  necessary  for  the  proper  ap- 
plication of  a  given  cause  to  achievement  of  a 
purpose  may  be  stated  thus: 

1 .  The  given  cause  itself  must  be 
brought  writhin  the  effective  control  of  the  per- 
son who  prosecutes  the  purpose. 

2.  The  given  cause  must  be  isolated 
from  the  influence  of  every  other  cause  which 
cannot  be  controlled  and  by  w^hich  the  pur- 
pose might  otherwise  be  defeated. 

3.  Every  cause,  w^hether  of  the  same  or 
of  a  different  class,  from  w^hich  the  given  cause 
cannot  be  isolated  must  be  under  effective 
control. 

51 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Now,  should  it  be  possible  for  a  change  in 
existence  to  occur  without  any  cause  whatever 
then  this  change  might  arbitrarily  affect  any 
given  cause  in  immediate  use  for  achievement 
of  some  purpose  and  this  would  violate  the 
first  condition.  Should  the  arbitrary  change 
in  existence  affect  any  cause  from  which  the 
given  cause  had  been  isolated  it  might  break 
down  the  isolation  and  the  second  condition 
would  be  violated.  Should  the  uncaused 
change  affect  any  cause  from  which  the  given 
cause  could  not  be  isolated  then  all  those 
causes  w^ould  not  be  under  effective  control 
and  this  would  violate  the  third  condition. 
Should  a  change  in  existence  be  brought  about 
by  an  inadequate  cause  then  part  of  the  change 
would  be  writhout  any  cause  and  all  the  condi- 
tions w^ould  be  violated  for  the  reasons  stated. 
Therefore,    the  systematic    application    of 

52 


CAUSATION  AND  REGULATION. 

any  cause  to  achievement  of  any  purpose  re- 
quires that  an  efFect  without  an  adequate  cause 
shall  be  impossible. 

This  means  that  achievement  of  purpose 
is  impracticable  without  what  is  known  as: 

The  Principle  of  Causation: 

There  must  be  an  adequate 
cause  for  every  possible  efFect  or 
event. 

Should  the  same  cause  or  a  similar  cause 
under  the  same  or  similar  conditions  pro- 
duce different  effects  then  the  difference  in 
effect  w^ould  be  an  effect  for  w^hich  there 
w^ould  be  no  cause  and  this  would  violate  the 
Principle  of  Causation. 

Therefore,  achievement  of  purpose  is  im- 
practicable vsrithout  what  is  called: 

The  Principle  of  Regulation : 

Similar  causes  under  similar 
conditions  must  invariably  produce 
similar  effects. 

53 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Should  an  effect  be  changed  by  change 
in  time  or  space,  all  other  conditions  and  rela- 
tions remaining  the  same,  then  the  Principle 
of  Regulation  would  be  void. 

Whence,  achievement  of  purpose  requires 
the  truth  of  w^hat  may  be  styled : 

The  Principle  of  Stability: 

The  effect  of  a  cause  is  inde- 
pendent of  absolute  position  in  time 
or  space. 

Matter  w^ithout  ability   to  produce  effect 

cannot  be  known  and  need  not  be  considered. 

Consequently,  should  any  item  of  corporeal 

existence  be  subject  to  increase  or  diminution 

w^ithout  transfer  of  material  from  or  to  some 

other  item  then  control  of  the  energies  of  that 

item  w^ould  be  impracticable.      One  instance 

of  this  would  indicate  its  possibility  in  every 

case  and  leave  no  dependable  physical  basis 

for  systematic  application  of  cause. 

54 


CONSERVATION  OF  MATTER. 

Now,  the  systematic  application  of  any 
cause  without  a  dependable  physical  basis  is 
impracticable. 

Therefore,  an  essential  condition  of  the 
achievement  of  a  purpose  is: 

The  Principle  of  Conservation  of  Matter: 

The  sum  total  of  all  corporeal 
substances  is  constant. 

The  systematic  application  of  a  given 
cause  to  achievement  of  a  purpose  involves,  of 
course,  effective  control  of  its  energy.  In  or- 
der that  this  may  be  practicable  the  following 
conditions  must  obtain: 

1 .  Effective  control  of  the  energy  as  to 
action,  inaction  and  direction. 

2.  Isolation  of  the  energy  from  every  other 
energy  that  is  beyond  control. 

3.  Effective  control  of  every  energy  from 
w^hich  the  energy  of  the  given  cause  cannot  be 
isolated. 

55 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Should  it  be  possible  for  the  energy  of 
any  given  cause  to  increase  or  diminish  in  and 
of  itself  and  without  relation  to  any  other 
cause  then  there  might  be  arbitrary  fluctua- 
tions which  w^ould  make  impracticable  effec- 
tive control  of  the  energy,  violate  the  first  con- 
dition cited  and,  theoretically  at  least,  make 
not  only  the  given  cause  but  every  cause  of  the 
same  class  unfit  for  use  in  the  systematic  pro- 
duction of  any  intended  effect.  This  w^ould 
mean  that  in  the  achievement  of  human  pur- 
poses all  such  causes  should  be  excluded.  But 
this  exclusion,  by  reason  of  the  numerous  and 
close  relations  that  are  know^n  to  prevail 
among  causes  of  different  classes,  would  its- 
self  be  the  object  of  a  purpose  involving  the 
causes  in  question.  As  a  consequence,  the  is- 
olation of  controllable  energies  required  in 
the  achievement  of  any  given  purpose  might 

56 


CORRELATION  OF  ENERGY. 

be  impracticable  and  the  second  condition  be 
violated.  This  would  mean,  of  course,  that 
there  would  not  be  effective  control  of  energies 
from  which  controllable  energies  could  not  be 
isolated  and  this  would  violate  the  third  con- 
dition. 

Therefore,  it  is  essential  to  achievement 
of  human  purposes  that  an  absolute  change 
of  energy  shall  be  impossible. 

This  naturally  requires  that  no  change  in 
the  energy  of  any  cause  shall  be  possible  ex- 
cept through  transfer  of  equivalent  energy  to 
or  from  some  other  cause. 

Whence  achievement  of  human  purposes 
is  impracticable  without  what  is  known  as: 

The  Principle  of  Correlation: 

The  exact  amount  of  energy 
that  is  acquired  or  given  up  by  any 
cause  must  invariably  be  given  up 
or  acquired  by  some  other  cause. 

57 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

An  increase  in  the  energy  of  a  given 
cause  without  an  equivalent  diminution  of  the 
energy  of  some  other  cause  would  be  a  change 
in  existence  without  an  adequate  cause  and 
violate  the  Principle  of  Causation.  A  decresise 
in  the  energy  of  a  given  cause  without  trans- 
fer to  some  other  cause  would  be  equivalent 
to  an  arbitrary  decrease  in  energy,  prevent 
the  cause  from  producing  similar  effects  un- 
der similar  conditions  and  violate  the  Princi- 
ple of  Regulation. 

Whence,  as  might  also  have  been  derived 
from  the  principle  of  Correlation,  achieve- 
ment of  human  purposes  would  be  impracti- 
cable wthout  what  is  called: 

The  Principle  of  Conservation  of  Energy: 

The  total  of  the  actual  and  po- 
tential energies  of  existence  is  in- 
variable. 


58 


PRINCIPLES  AND  VITAL  CAUSES. 

The  six  principles  which  have  been  de- 
veloped as  indispensable  to  achievement  of 
the  purposes  of  man  are  the  same  that  have 
been  shown  by  processes  of  physical  science 
to  be  true  for  all  causes  inherent  in  inert  mat- 
ter. 

Whether  the  principles  of  Causation, 
Regulation,  Stability,  Correlation  and  Conser- 
vation of  Energy  are  true  for  the  properties  of 
plants  and  for  the  faculties  and  propensities  of 
animals  has  not  been  determined  by  science 
with  the  mathematical  accuracy  possible  with 
purely  physical  causes;  but  short  of  arithmet- 
ical precision,  there  is  abundant  evidence  that 
those  five  principles  should  be  recognized  as 
true  for  the  vital  causes  mentioned. 

Also,  the  testimony  of  science  is  to  the 
effect  that  the  principles  of  Causation,  Regu- 

59 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

lation  and  Stability  are  true  for  all  intellec- 
tual qualifications: 

The  general  attitude  of  science  towards 
the  correlation  and  conservation  of  intellec- 
tual energies  is  indicated  by  the  following  quo- 
tations from  an  appendix  by  Professor  Alex- 
ander Bain  to  a  treatise  on  The  Conservation 
of  Energy  by  Professor  Balfour  Stewart. 

**That  there  is  a  definite  equiv- 
alence between  mental  manifesta- 
tions and  physical  forces,  the  same 
as  between  the  physical  forces  them- 
selves, is,  I  think,  conformable  to  all 
the  facts,  although  liable  to  peculiar 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  decisive 
proof: 

I.  The  mental  manifestations 
are  in  exact  proportion  to  their 
physical  supports. 

If  the  doctrine  of  the  thorough- 
going connection  of  mind  and  body 
is  good  for  anything,  it  must  go  this 
length.  There  must  be  a  numerical- 
ly-proportioned rise  and  fall  of  the 
two  together. 

60 


CORRELATION  OF  ENERGIES 

Further  along  he  states  that: 

**II.  There  remains  another  ap- 
plication of  the  doctrine,  perhaps 
equally  interesting  to  contemplate, 
and  more  within  my  special  line  of 
study.  I  mean  the  correlation  of  the 
mental  forces  among  themselves 
(still  viewed  in  the  conjoint  arrange- 
ment) .  Just  cis  w^e  assign  limits  to 
mind  as  a  w^hole,  by  a  reference  to 
the  grant  of  physical  expenditure,  in 
oxidization  etc.,  for  the  department, 
so  we  must  assign  limits  to  the  dif- 
ferent phases  or  modes  of  mental 
work — thought,  feeling  and  so  on — 
according  to  the  share  allotted  to 
each;  so  that,  while  the  mind  as  a 
whole  may  be  stinted  by  the  de- 
mands of  the  non-mental  functions, 
each  separate  manifestation  is 
bounded  by  the  requirements  of  the 
others.  This  is  an  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  the  general  principle,  and 
equally  receives  the  confirmation  of 
experience. 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  conclusive 

proof  by  ordinary  scientific  processes  of  the 

61 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

general  correlation  and  conservation  of  all 
physical,  vital  and  intellectual  energies,  which 
v^ere  referred  to  by  Professor  Bain,  would 
seem  to  be  insuperable  because  of  the  com- 
plications involved  and  the  impossibility  of  ob- 
taining the  necessary  exact  data. 

But  if  it  can  be  shown  that  an  effect  or 
event  has  been  brought  about  which  could  not 
conceivably  have  been  produced  without  the 
general  conservation  and  inter-correlation  of 
all  existing  energies  then  the  principles  of  con- 
servation and  correlation  of  energies  may  be 
recognized  as  having  universal  application. 

Now,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
welfare  of  man  has  been  advanced  as  the  gen- 
eral result  of  all  the  numerous,  diverse,  good 
and  evil  purposes  that  he  has  achieved  from 
the  beginning  until  the  present  time.     And  it 

62 


GENERAL  PROOF  OF  PRINCIPLES. 

has  been  shown  that  this  advancement  is  due 
to  the  systematic  and  natural  predominance 
of  good  over  evil  purposes. 

This  means  that  systematic  and  success-* 
ful  application  of  causes  of  every  kind  must 
have  been  made,  each  in  relation  to  and  under 
the  influence  of  causes  and  energies  of  every 
class. 

Therefore,  causes  of  every  kind  may  be 
regarded  as  having  been  systematically  and 
successfully  applied  to  the  achievement  of  a 
single  purpose  that  had  for  its  object  the  ad- 
vancement of  human  welfare. 

Consequently,  the  systematic  application 
of  every  known  cause  to  the  achievement  of 
a  single  purpose  may  be  regarded  as  practi- 
cable. 

But  every  one  of  the  six  principles  de- 
veloped was  show^n  to  be  indispensable  to  the 

63 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

systematic  application  of  causes  and  their  en- 
ergies to  achievement  of  human  purposes. 
Whence,  it  appears  that: 

The  principles  of  Conservation  and  Cor- 
relation, in  so  far  as  man  can  be  concerned, 
may  be  accepted  as  true  for  all  physical,  vital 
and  intellectual  energies. 


G4 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  V. 

LAW  AND  ORDER. 

A  law  is  here  considered  as  a  rule  of  nat- 
ural action  in  virtue  of  which  a  certain  cause, 
whenever  and  wherever  placed  under  certain 
conditions,  must  invariably  produce  a  certain 
effect. 

The  principal  laws  which  have  been  so 
far  developed  may,  for  convenience,  be  classi- 
fied with  respect  to  the  energies  which  they 
control,  as  follows: 

THE  LAWS  OF  PHYSICAL  ACTION. 

The  Law  of  Gravitation: 

Any  two  material  bodies  con- 
tinually attract  each  other  with  a 
definite  force  proportional  to  the 
product  of  their  masses  divided  by 
the  square  of  the  distance  between 
their  centers. 

65 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  Laws  of  Motion  and  Force: 

Any  material  body  acted  upon 
by  a  force  and  then  left  free  and  un- 
disturbed will  invariably  move  with 
uniform  velocity  in  a  straight  line  in 
the  direction  of  the  action  of  the 
force. 

Any  force  while  acting  on  a 
body  for  a  given  time  invariably  pro- 
duces a  definite  velocity  proportion- 
al to  the  intensity  of  the  force  divid- 
ed by  the  mass  of  the  body. 

To  the  action  of  every  force 
there  is  invariably  an  equal  and  op- 
posite reaction. 

The  Laws  of  Physical  Energy: 

TTie  amount  of  energy  required 
to  produce  a  certain  velocity  in  a 
body  is  equal  to  one  half  the  mass 
of  the  body  multiplied  by  the  square 
of  the  velocity. 

The  amount  of  energy  re- 
quired to  bring  a  moving  body  to 
rest  is  equal  to  the  square  of  its  veloc- 
ity multiplied  by  one  half  its  mass. 

In   addition  to  the  laws   cited,   there  are 

numerous  others,  such  as  those  which  relate 

66 


NATURAL  LAWS. 

to  inertia  and  rotation,  and  such  as  the  laws 
by  which  the  strength,  rigidity,  elasticity  and 
flexibility  of  materials  are  governed,  which 
need  not  be  set  forth  here. 

The  Laws  of  Chemical  Affinity: 

Any  kinds  of  matter  that  can 
combine  will,  under  the  same  con- 
ditions, invariably  unite  in  definite 
proportion  and  form  the  same  chem- 
ical compound. 

The  Laws  of  Chemical  Energy: 

. 

The  same  chemical  combina- 
tion of  the  same  quantities  of  the 
same  kinds  of  matter  invariably  lib- 
erates the  same  amount  of  energy. 

Disintegration  of  the  same 
quantity  of  the  same  chemical  com- 
pound invariably  stores  up  the  same 
amount  of  energy. 

The  systematic  transformation  of  chem- 
ical into  physical  energy  is  made  generally 
possible  by  numerous  laws  relating  to  develop- 
ment and  application  of  heat. 

67 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Vital  action  is  understood  to  be  a  spe- 
cial manifestation  of  chemical  affinity  and 
chemical  energy.     Its  general  laws  are: 

The  Laws  of  Natural  Selection: 

Any  species  of  plant  or  animal 
under  conditions  unsuited  to  its  na- 
ture but  not  fatal  naturally  under- 
goes such  changes  and  acquires  such 
additional  qualities  as  tend  to  adapt 
it  to  its  environment. 

Competition  between  different 
species  or  between  individuals  of  the 
same  species  under  conditions  not 
generally  destructive  naturally  en- 
hances hardihood  and  efficiency. 

Every  plant  or  animal  under 
conditions  suitable  for  its  propaga- 
tion naturally  transmits  to  its  pos- 
terity certain  inherited  qualities  to- 
gether with  other  qualities  acquired 
by  itself. 

The  Laws  of  Sensation: 

All  those  rules  of  organic  ac- 
tion by  which  similar  animal  organ- 
isms from  similar  causes  under  simi- 
lar conditions  naturally  experience 
similar  sensations. 


LAWS  OF  INTELLECTUAL  ACTION. 

The  Laws  of  Thought: 

All  those  rules  of  intellectual 
action  by  virtue  of  which  men  of 
similar  qualifications,  starting  with 
knowledge  of  certain  facts  and 
truths,  do,  entirely  by  mental  proc- 
esses, acquire  knowledge  of  other 
facts  and  truths. 

TTie  Laws  of  Emotion: 

All  those  rules  of  mental  action 
according  to  which  men  of  similar 
qualifications  under  the  influence 
of  similar  sensation  and  thought  nat- 
urally experience  similar  emotions. 

Intellectual  action  is  here  understood  to 
sustain  invariable  but  not  generally  determin- 
ate relations  to  vital  action. 

Since  any  cause  that  is  governed  by  a  law 
must  invariably  produce  the  same  or  a  similar 
effect  whenever  and  wherever  it  may  be 
placed  under  the  same  or  similar  conditions  it 
is  evident  that  those  conditions  must  be  such 
as  to  bring  the  cause  into  proper  initial  action 

65" 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  to  insure  production  of  the  effect  by  ac- 
curate direction  and  control  of  the  operation. 
This  means  that: 

Every  law,  by  its  own  condi- 
tions, must  be  self -enforcing. 

TTie  first  time  any  cause  produces  an  ef- 
fect it  must  establish  a  self-enforcing  law  for 
the  reason  that,  by  the  Principle  of  Regula- 
tion, the  same  or  a  similar  cause  w^henever  and 
wherever  placed  under  the  same  or  similar 
conditions  must  invariably  produce  the  same 
or  a  similar  effect. 

Consequently,  whenever  a  cause  pro- 
duces an  effect  it  must  either  establish  a  self- 
enforcing  law  or  conform  to  one  previously 
established  by  a  similar  cause  under  similar 

conditions. 

Whence,  by  the  Principle  of  Regulation: 

All  causes  must  act  according 
to  self -enforcing  law. 

70 


CONDITIONS  OF  A  LAW. 

The  conditions  under  which  any  cause, 
subject  to  the  terms  of  a  self-enforcing  law, 
may  have  produced  an  effect  include  and  are 
limited  to  its  relations  to  every  other  cause  by 
which  the  effect  had  been  or  might  have  been 
influenced.  For  it  is  certain  that  every  pos- 
sible influence  of  every  other  cause  must  be 
included  and  it  is  evident  that  there  can  be  no 
occasion  for  the  inclusion  of  anything  else. 

The  production  of  an  effect  except  by  a 
cause  subject  to  certain  conditions  would  be 
equivalent  to  original  creation  and  this,  not  be- 
ing conceivable,  need  not  be  considered  here. 

Therefore,  the  action  of  every  cause 
which  can  be  conceived  of  as  available  for  the 
achievement  of  a  human  purpose  must  be  re- 
garded as  subject  to  certain  determining  condi- 
tions. 

71 
-6- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  it  has  been  shown  that  the  conditions 
under  which  any  cause  can  produce  an  effect 
are  limited  to  the  influences  of  other  causes. 

Therefore,  the  action  or  influence  of  more 
than  a  single  cause  is  always  necessary  for 
the  production  of  an  effect. 

This  means  that: 

Every  law,  by  virtue  of  its  ow^n 
conditions,  must  insure  the  co-opera- 
tion of  two  or  more  causes. 

That  this  proposition  has  not  aWays  been 
given  the  attention  its  importance  seems  to  de- 
serve is  indicated  by  the  following  remark  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton: 

**I  have  already  noticed  to  you 
the  error  of  philosophers  in  suppos- 
ing that  anything  can  have  a  single 
cause." 

In  view  of  w^hat  has  been  stated  it  is  evi- 
dent that  in  every  case  in  which  several  causes 
come  into  co-operation  and  produce  a  single 

72 


ORDER. 

joint  effect,  that  eflFect  may  be  regarded  as 
having  been  brought  about  by  any  one  of  the 
causes  according  to  its  own  self -enf  orcing  law, 
the  conditions  of  w^hich  include  the  influences 
of  all  the  others. 

Whence,  by  general  principles  of  Reg- 
ulation and  of  Stability,  it  must  be  true  that: 

Similar  sets  of  respectively 
similar  co-operative  causes  must  in- 
variably come  into  action  and  pro- 
duce a  similar  joint  effect  whenever 
and  wherever  they  are  placed  under 
similar  conditions  and  in  the  same 
co-operative  relations  to  one  an- 
other. 

Order  is  here  understood  to  be  that  gen- 
eral condition  which  prevails  among  several 
causes  and  the  special  conditions  and  relations 
under  which  they  are  placed,  when  all  invaria- 
bly co-operate  and  produce  the  same  single 
joint  effect, 

73 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Rules  of  Order  are  special  natural  rules 
of  relative  action,  reaction  and  inaction  by  vir- 
tue of  which  several  definite  causes  invariably 
come  into  co-operation  and  produce  a  similar 
joint  effect  whenever  and  wherever  they  are 
placed  under  similar  extraneous  conditions 
and  in  the  same  co-operative  relations. 

From  this   definition  the  proposition   last 

developed  may  be  stated  thus: 

Similar  sets  of  respectively 
similar  co-operative  causes  must  in- 
variably come  into  action  and  pro- 
duce a  similar  joint  effect  whenever 
and  wherever  placed  under  similar 
rules  of  order. 

Since,  as  has  been  show^n,  every  joint  ef- 
fect of  several  causes  may  be  regarded  as  the 
effect  of  any  one  of  the  causes  acting  accord- 
ing to  its  own  self-enforcing  law,  rules  of  order 
may  be  treated  as  rules  defining  the  conditions 
and  relations  under  which  a  given  cause  may 

74 


RULES  OF  ORDER. 

be  depended  upon  to  come  into  operation  and 
produce  a  required  effect. 

The  rules  of  order  under  which  causes  co- 
operate are  of  incalculable  number  auid  va- 
riety. This  is,  of  course,  because  of  the  close 
and  efficient  relations  that  prevail  among 
causes  and  because  of  the  many  different  com- 
binations of  causes,  conditions  and  relations 
under  which  they  will  produce  joint  effects. 

The  rules  of  order  that  have  been  devel- 
oped and  reduced  to  writing  are  classified,  ac- 
cording to  the  phenomena  to  which  they  relate, 
under  the  heads  of  Astronomy,  Physics,  Me- 
chanics, Chemistry,  Botany,  Zoology,  Meta- 
physics, Jurisprudence  etc.,  and  are  available 
in  the  numerous  treatises  on  those  subjects  as 
a  theoretical  basis  for  achievement  of  human 
purposes. 

75 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  systematic  application  of  causes  to 
achievement  of  a  single  purpose  through  prin- 
ciples, laws  and  rules  of  order  may  be  illustrat- 
ed practically  thus: 

An  engineer  in  designing  a  steam  pile 
driver  depends  upon  the  six  general  principles 
of  existence  for  control  and  isolation  of  the 
causes  and  energies  he  intends  to  use;  he  de- 
pends upon  the  laws  of  gravity  and  of  motion 
and  force  and  upon  the  ascertained  strength, 
rigidity,  elasticity  and  other  qualities  of  vari- 
ous kinds  of  matter  as  being  the  same  for  sim- 
ilar materials;  he  also  depends  upon  the  chem- 
ical energies  of  fuel  as  the  source  of  power  for 
the  machine.  With  these  as  a  basis  he  specifies 
certain  rules  of  order  which  he  knows  must  be 
observed  in  the  material,  shape,  dimensions 
and  relative  position  of  each  part  to  the  end 
that  the  completed  machine  when  subjected  to 

76 


RULES  OF  ORDER. 

certain  conditions  will  come  into  action  and 
deliver  a  powerful  impact  upon  a  pile. 

To  make  the  machine  thus  designed  the 
manufacturer  must  apply  certain  rules  of  order 
with  respect  to  the  tools  and  the  materials  he 
must  use  and  in  addition  he  must  apply  other 
rules  of  order  necessary  for  the  co-operation 
of  his  employes. 

The  pile  driver  having  been  completed,  is 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  an  organization  of 
men  w^ho  under  certain  rules  of  order  must  co- 
operate w^ith  one  another  to  produce  the  effect 
for  which  the  machine  was  designed  and  con- 
structed. 

Rules  of  order  for  the  systematic  co-op- 
eration of  men  must,  of  course,  be  based  upon 
physical  principles  and  laws  but  they  all  natur- 
ally depend  directly  upon  the  laws  of  sensa- 
tion, thought  and  emotion. 

77 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

With  due  regard  to  standard  authority, 
sensation,  thought  and  emotion,  respectively, 
are  here  understood  as  indicated  by  the  follow- 
ing definitions: 

Sensation  is  an  immediate  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain  produced  in  the  mind  when- 
ever a  cause  perceptibly  affects  an  organ  of 
sense. 

This  definition  is  based  on  the  consider- 
ation that  a  sensation  without  any  perceptible 
pleasure  or  pain  wrould  be  without  practical 
significance. 

Thought  is  that  process  by  which  the 
mind,  entirely  through  the  exercise  of  its  own 
powers,  acquires  know^ledge  and  improves  its 
faculties  and  capacities. 

The  only  available  data  for  processes  of 
thought  are:  events  of  existence  indicated  by 
sensation;  self  evident  propositions  and  as- 
sumptions of  the  imagination. 

78 


SENSATION,  THOUGHT  AND  EMOTION. 

Emotion  is  a  state  of  mind  brought  about 
entirely  by  the  action  of  the  mind  itself  while 
under  the  influence  of  sensation,  of  thought  or 
of  both. 

The  mental  condition  manifested  through 
emotion  is  understood  to  be  that  by  which  the 
mind  is  moved  to  the  determination  of  a  pur- 
pose. This  means  that  emotion  is  the  state  of 
mind  through  which  sensation  and  thought  are 
given  practical  expression. 

Accordingly,  the  general  practical  rela- 
tions of  sensation,  thought  and  emotion  to  one 
another  are  understood  to  be  that: 

The  practical  significance  of  a  sensation 
depends  upon  the  emotions  it  arouses,  the  na- 
ture of  those  emotions  depends  upon  the  state 
of  the  body  and  the  qualifications  of  the  mind; 
manifestations  of  emotion  are  determined  by 
extraneous  influences  and  processes  o  f 
thought. 

79 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Were  the  conduct  of  men  determined  en- 
tirely by  sensation  their  co-operation  might  be 
gained  through  influence  of  natural  conditions 
as  in  the  case  of  animals  when  confronted  with 
a  common  danger.  But  the  action  of  a  man 
is  often  w^idely  different  from  w^hat  might  be 
expected  from  such  influences.  The  reasons 
are,  as  already  indicated,  that  the  conduct  of 
a  man  is  determined  by  his  emotions ;  that  these 
are  continually  influenced  by  fluctuations  of 
sensation  of  w^hich  an  observer  can  have  no 
definite  knowledge;  that  emotions  are  also  de- 
termined largely  by  propensities,  peculiarities 
and  habits  of  thought  of  w^hich  the  man  himself 
may  not  have  adequate  conceptions. 

This  being  true,  it  is  manifest  that  in  order 
that  men  may  be  brought  to  work  systematic- 
ally and  persistently  towards  a  common  object 


80 


CO-OPERATION  OF  MEN, 

they  must  be  subjected  to  some  general 
condition  of  power  and  scope  sufficient  to 
counteract  those  obscure  and  compHcated  in- 
fluences which  affect  their  individual  thoughts 
and  emotions  and  tend  to  cause  independent 
action. 

Now,  the  only  general  condition  that  can 
be  depended  upon  to  control  the  individual 
thoughts  and  emotions  of  a  number  of  men  suf- 
ficiently to  bring  about  and  maintain  their  sys- 
tematic co-operation  is  that  w^hich  conserves 
or  advances  or  w^hich  they  believe  will  conserve 
or  advance  their  individual  and  collective  w^el- 
fare. 

Whence,  as  is  otherwise  well  known, 
human  welfare  and  progress  affords  the  only 
practicable  basis  for  rules  of  order  by  w^hich  the 
systematic  co-operation  of  men  can  be  effected. 


81 


LAW  AND  ORDER. 

Law  and  Order  is  understood  to  be  that 
general  condition  under  which  all  causes  in- 
volved must  act  and  all  effects  must  be  produc- 
ed according  to  self-enforcing  laws  and  rules 
of  order. 

The  unbroken  testimony  of  science  is  that 
all  phenomena  of  physical,  vital  and  intellec- 
tual existence  come  to  pass  according  to  law 
and  rules  of  order  and  that  there  prevails 
among  them  a  perfect  state  of  universal  self- 
enforcing  Law  and  Order. 


82 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  VI. 

MEANS  AND  METHOD. 

Means  is  here  understood  to  include: 

Every  cause,  agency,  truth, 
fact,  condition  or  relation  that  is 
available  for  achievement  of  the  pur- 
poses of  man. 

The  means  available  for  achievement  of 
human  purposes  may  be  summarized  thus: 
Existing  Causes: 

Inherent  powers  of  inert  mat- 
ter; properties  of  plants;  faculties 
and  propensities  of  animals;  quali- 
fications of  intelligent  agents. 

General  Principles  of  Existence. 

Conditions  and  Relations!  under  'which 
causes  w^ill  come  into  operation. 

Laws  of  Physical,  Vital  and  Intellectual 
action. 

Rules  of  Order  under  w^hich  causes  will 
come  into  action  and  produce  joint 
effects. 

83 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Method   is  here   regarded   as   the  manner 

in  which  means  are  applied  to  the  achievement 

of  purposes  or,  more  explicitly  as: 

The  systematic  procedure  by 
which  a  purpose  is  determined  in  the 
mind  and  adequate  means  are  devel- 
oped, selected,  obtained  and  applied 
to  accomplishment  of  the  object. 

Analytical  method  is  that  by  which  a  con- 
ception, material  body  or  an  event  or  effect  is 
separated  into  its  constituent  elements  or 
causes. 

Synthetic  method  is  the  procedure  by 
w^hich  elements  or  causes  are  combined  so  as 
to  produce  a  certain  conception,  material  body, 
effect  or  event. 

The  method  employed  in  any  given  case 
may  be  analytical  or  synthetic  or  it  may  in- 
volve both  kinds  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
purpose  and  the  known  means  available  for 
its  achievement. 

84 


METHOD. 

Methods  available  for  achievement  of  pur- 
poses relating  to  practical  affairs  have  for 
their  theoretical  basis  the  following  general 

process: 

Formation  of  some  conception 
of  a  final  effect. 

Discovery  of  all  subordinate 
effects  which  must  be  produced. 

Development  of  the  means  nec- 
essaryfor  production  of  all  required 
effects. 

Ascertainment  that  adequate 
means  are  obtainable. 

Determination  of  the  purpose 
in  the  mind  with  due  regard  to  ob- 
tainable means. 

Isolation  of  all  the  required 
causes  from  every  influence  that 
might  otherwise  defeat  the  purpose. 

Installation  of  the  necessary 
causes  under  such  conditions,  re- 
lations and  rules  of  order  that  they 
w^ill  come  into  proper  co-operation 
and  produce  the  final  intended  ef- 
fect, 

86 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  this  general  procedure  it  will  be  ob- 
served that,  by  definition,  the  discovery  of 
subordinate  effects  and  development  of  nec- 
essary means  are  analytical  processes  while 
all  the  others  are  synthetic. 

The  theoretical  procedure  w^hich  has 
been  outlined  may  be  illustrated  by  the  f  ollovsr- 
ing  practical  examples : 

A  man  from  his  observation  and  experi- 
ence concerning  structures  forms  a  general 
conception  of  a  building. 

He  prepares  plans  and  specifications  and 
thus  discovers  the  subordinate  effects  that 
must  be  produced  and  develops  the  means  re- 
quired to  complete  the  structure. 

Then,  should  he  be  inclined  to  proceed 
further,  he  would  first  make  sure  that  ade- 
quate means  w^ould  be  obtainable. 

This  having  been  done,  he  would  resolve 

86 


METHOD. 

to  construct  the  building  and  would  thus  de- 
termine the  purposes  in  his  mind. 

He  would  then  isolate  the  required 
causes  by  providing  a  site,  enclosing  it  if  nec- 
essary, and  assembling  upon  it  suitable  men 
and  materials  free  from  outside  influences. 

Finally  he  w^ould  install  the  men  and  ma- 
terials under  conditions,  relations  and  rules  of 
order  necessary  to  bring  all  into  proper  co- 
operation and  produce  the  structure  intended. 

This  procedure,  however,  would  apply  in 
strictness  only  to  the  first  building  of  the  kind 
that  this  man  might  erect  since,  in  case  of  a 
second  similar  structure,  the  analytical  proc- 
esses of  discovering  subordinate  effects  and 
developing  necessary  means  would  not  be 
required. 

In  case  of  a  farmer  who,  at  the  beginning 
of  a  season,  with  sufficient  means  at  hand  de- 

87 

-7- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

termines  to  reproduce  a  certain  crop  by  meth- 
ods previously  employed  the  analytical  proc- 
esses for  discovery  of  subordinate  effects  and 
development  of  necessary  means  v^ould  not  be 
required  because  the  effects  wrould  be  known 
and  the  means  wrould  be  at  hand. 

Therefore,  in  this  and  in  every  similar 
instance  all  methods  would  be  synthetic.  And 
the  same  is  true  of  all  purposes  relating  to  prac- 
tical affairs  wrhich  are  repeatedly  achieved  by 
the  same  person  v^ith  the  same  means  and  by 
the  same  methods. 

Thus,  in  the  ordinary  recurrent  purposes 
of  practical  life  the  natural  tendency  of  ex- 
perience is  to  reduce  analytical  processes  to  a 
minimum  and,  consequently,  to  lead  prac- 
tical men  to  depend  more  and  more  upon  syn- 
thetic methods  for  the  achievement  of  their 
purposes. 

88 


ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS. 

The     metaphysical     distinction     between 

analysis  and   synthesis  is  explained   by   Sir 

William  Hamilton  thus: 

**In  so  far,  therefore,  as  philos- 
ophy is  the  research  of  causes,  the 
one  necessary  condition  of  its  pos- 
sibility is  the  decomposition  of  ef- 
fects into  their  constituted  causes. 
This  is  the  fundamental  procedure 
of  philosophy,  and  is  called  by  a 
Greek  term  Analysis.  But  though 
analysis  may  be  the  fundamental 
procedure,  it  is  still  only  a  means  to- 
ward an  end.  We  analyze  only  that 
w^e  may  comprehend:  and  we  com- 
prehend only  inasmuch  as  we  are 
able  to  reconstruct  in  thought  the 
complex  effects  which  we  have  an- 
alyzed into  their  elements.  This 
mental  reconstruction  is,  therefore, 
the  final,  consummative  procedure 
of  philosophy,  and  it  is  known  by 
the  Greek  term  Sjmthesis." 

This  abstract  distinction,  however,  is 
not  sufficient  for  purposes  of  practical  phil- 
osophy because  it  limits  the  knowledge   of 


89 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

causes  to  ability  to  reconstruct  in  thought 
alone  the  complex  effects  that  have  been  an- 
alyzed into  their  elements;  whereas,  in  order 
that  the  knowledge  shall  be  complete,  it  must 
confer  ability  to  reconstruct  the  effect  in  actual 
practice. 

In  addition  to  this  much  know^ledge  of 
great  practical  importance  is  acquired  entire- 
ly by  synthetic  processes  in  the  prosecution 
of  experimental  and  tentative  purposes  vdth  a 
view^  to  improvement  and  development  of 
means  and  methods. 

It  is  w^ell  knowrn  that  while  sets  of  re- 
spectively similar  causes  acting  under  certain 
laws  and  rules  of  order  must  produce  similar 
effects,  it  is  also  true  that: 

The  same  effect  may  generally 
be  produced  by  different  causes  act- 
ing under  different  rules  of  order. 

It   is   in    virtue   of   this    important   propo- 

90 


IMPROVEMENT. 

sition  that  men,  under  the  changing  conditions 
of  practical  life,  are  enabled,  by  modification 
of  means  and  methods  to  reproduce  effects 
necessary  for  their  saf ety,subsistance  and  com- 
fort and  thus  adapt  themselves  to  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  their  environment. 

Also,  wrere  the  proposition  not  true,  then 
there  would  be  but  one  way  of  doing  anything 
and  all  the  numerous  and  great  improvements 
in  means  and  methods  which  contribute  so 
largely  to  human  progress  would  be  impracti- 
cable; such  as,  for  instance,  improvements  in 
means  and  methods  available  for  agriculture, 
mining,  manufacture  and  transportation. 

Another  great  source  of  progress  is  to  be 
found  in  the  proposition  that : 

Different  effects  may  be  pro- 
duced by  the  same  or  respectively 
similar  causes  under  different  rules 
of  order. 

91 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

By  virtue  of  this  proposition  it  is  often 
practicable  to  increase  to  a  wonderful  degree 
the  number  and  importance  of  the  purposes 
that  may  readily  be  achieved  by  the  same  ob- 
tainable means.     For  illustration: 

The  physical  energy  of  gravitation,  by 
means  of  an  elevated  body  of  water,  is  used 
for  the  production  of  heat,  light  and  electricty 
and  for  purposes  of  irrigation,  manufacture 
and  transportation;  the  chemical  energies  of 
combustion  are  used  for  the  same  purposes 
and  for  numerous  others  w^idely  different  in 
kind  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  properties  of 
plants  and  animals.  And  above  all,  the  quali- 
fications of  intelligent  agents  may  be  applied 
to  all  the  innumerable  purposes  necessary  for 
the  conservation  and  advancement  of  human 
w^elfare. 


92 


RESOURCES. 

That  the  resources  known  to  be  avail- 
able for  achievement  of  the  purposes  of  man 
are  commensurate  with  his  actual  and  poten- 
tial ability  to  make  efficient  use  of  them  is  in- 
dicated by  the  abundance,  diversity  and  ef- 
ficiency of  causes;  by  the  manifold  and  inti- 
mate relations  that  prevail  among  physical, 
vital  and  intellectual  causes  and  their  energies ; 
by  the  general  principles  by  w^hich  causes  and 
their  energies  are  conserved  and  controlled; 
by  the  incalculable  number  of  conditions  and 
relations  under  w^hich  causes  w^ill  come  into 
action;  by  the  self -enforcing  laws  by  which  all 
causes  and  energies  are  governed;  by  the  in- 
numerable rules  of  order  under  which  causes 
will  come  into  co-operation ;  by  the  variety  of 
methods  by  which  different  causes  may  be 
subjected  to  different  rules  of  order  and  thus 


98 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  made  to  produce  similar  effects;  by  the  dif- 
ferent effects  which,  by  change  of  method, 
may  be  brought  about  by  similar  causes. 

This  provision  of  means  and  methods, 
however,  is  not  more  wonderful  than  the  con- 
dition that  howsoever  ignorant  and  imperfect 
man  may  be;  howsoever  great  may  be  his 
blunders;  howsoever  disastrous  may  be  his 
conduct  he  will  invariably  be  brought  back 
into  the  proper  course  of  progress  by  the  mar- 
velous provision  that: 

Good  things,  as  a  wrhole,  must 
predominate  all  that  are  evil. 


94 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

INTELLECTUAL  EFFICIENCY. 

Intellectual  efficiency  is  understood  to 
be  that  state  or  condition  of  the  mind  which 
qualifies  a  man  in  disposition  and  ability  for 
the  systematic  application  of  means  and  meth- 
od to  achievement  of  purposes  without  pres- 
ent or  immediate  regard  to  distinctions  of  good 
and  evil. 

The  only  known  criterion  by  which  the 
intellectual  efficiency  of  a  man  can  be  properly 
judged  is  to  be  found  in  the  purposes  he  has 
actually  achieved. 

Now,  in  order  that  the  achievements  of 
a  man  may  be  a  proper  measure  of  his  intel- 
lectual efficiency  he  must,  of  course,  be  free 
to  respond  to  the  influences  brought  to  bear 
on  his  mind  and  must  not  be  unduly  deprived 
of  suitable  means. 

95 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

For  this  reason,  in  treating  of  intellec- 
tual efficiency,  it  will  be  assumed  that  no  man 
is  improperly  restrained  and  that  every  man 
can  obtain  adequate  means  for  the  proper 
achievement  of  every  purpose  v^ithin  the  range 
of  his  mental  capacities  and  faculties. 

Accordingly,  intellectual  efficiency  will 
be  treated  as  that  state  or  condition  of  mind 
which  manifests  itself  in  the  systematic 
achievement  of  purposes. 

The  qualifications  w^hich  constitute  in- 
tellectual efficiency  are  understood  to  in- 
volve, either  directly  or  indirectly,  every 
elemental  capacity,  faculty  and  propensity  of 
mind;  for  otherwise  there  would  be  certain 
qualities  for  which  there  would  be  no  use  and 
this  is  inconsistent  with  the  general  economy 
of  existence  as  known  to  man. 


96 


INTELLECTUAL  QUALIFICATIONS. 

Observation  and  experience,  however, 
show  that  the  elements  of  mind  Uke  the  ele- 
ments of  physical  existence  must  enter  into 
various  combinations  in  order  to  be  available 
for  the  systematic  achievement  of  purposes. 

Therefore,  the  intellectual  qualifications 
necessary  for  achievement  of  human  purposes 
may  be  regarded  generally  as  combinations 
of  elemental  properties,  faculties  and  propen- 
sities of  the  mind. 

Under  the  definitions  given  it  is  evident 
that  the  first  condition  of  intellectual  efficiency 
is  an  adequate  disposition  for  achievement 
which  will  here  be  designated  by  the  term 
Spirit. 

The  nature  of  Spirit  as  here  understood 
may  be  developed  from  the  f oUow^ing  dialogue 


97 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  appears  in  the  First  Alcibiades  of  Plato: 

Socrates.  Now  then,  does  not  a  man  use 
his  whole  body? 

Alcibiades.  Unquestionably. 

Socrates.  But  w^e  are  agreed  that  he  who 
uses,  and  that  which  is  used,  are  different. 

Alcibiades.  Yes. 

Socrates.  A  man  is,  therefore,  different 
from  his  body? 

Alcibiades.  So  I  think. 

Socrates.  What  then  is  a  man? 

Alcibiades.  I  cannot  say. 

Socrates.  You  can  at  least  say  that  the 
man  is  that  w^hich  uses  the  body? 

Alcibiades.  True. 

Socrates.  Now  does  anything  use  the 
body  but  the  mind. 

Alcibiades.  Nothing. 


98 


MIND  AND  BODY. 

Socrates.  The  mind  is,  therefore,  the  man. 

Alcibiades.  The  mind  alone. 

The  distinction  here  made  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  on  the  basis  of  use  is  recog- 
nized by  Aristotle  the  foremost  exponent  of 
practical  action  as  well  as  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton  who  seems  to  have  given  such  action 
slight  consideration. 

Now^,  while  the  mind  uses  the  body  as  a 
means  for  achievement  it  also  employs  certain 
qualifications  of  its  own.  So  that  on  a  basis 
of  use  the  mind  may  be  regarded  as  that  which 
uses  all  intellectual  qualifications  employed  in 
the  achievement  of  purposes.  Or,  to  state  it 
differently,  the  mind  is  that  which  vvrould  re- 
main after  all  its  useful  capacities  and  faculties 
had  been  eliminated.  This  would  leave  what 
is  generally  known  as  Spirit  which,  in  its  most 


99 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

comprehensive  sense  has  been  defined  by  a 
leading  authority  as: 

*'The  soul  of  man;  the  intelli- 
gent, immaterial  and  immortal  part 
of  human  beings." 

The  only  way  in  which  practical  signif- 
icance can  be  given  to  this  abstract  conception 
is  to  consider  spirit  as  the  equivalent  of  a  dis-- 
position  for  effort  or  action;  for  it  is  only 
through  this  disposition  that  spirit  can  mani- 
fest itself.  And  the  only  w^ay  in  wrhich  a 
disposition  for  effort  or  action  can  represent 
the  intelligent  part  of  man  is  by  the  systematic 
achievement  of  purposes.  Thus,  evidently, 
from  these  considerations,  spirit  is  more  con- 
cretely defined  by  the  same  authority  as: 

* 'Eager  desire;  disposition  of 
mind  excited  and  directed  to  a  par- 
ticular object." 

100 


SPIRIT. 

Similarly,     according    to     another    recog- 
nized authority,  spirit  is: 

**That     which    pervades    and 
tempers  the  conduct  and  thought  of 


men," 


Thus  it  appears  that  spirit  is  to  the  mind 
what  life  is  to  the  body  and  that  as,  to  the 
extent  that  life  is  absent  a  body  may  not  be 
recognized  as  an  effective  organism,  so  to  the 
extent  that  a  man  is  not  endow^ed  w^ith  spirit 
he  may  not  be  recognized  as  an  intelligent 
agent. 

But  although  from  what  has  been  stated 
spirit  when  taken  in  the  abstract  represents 
the  primordial  substance  of  mind  it  may,  when 
considered  with  respect  to  the  practical  affairs 
of  life,  be  accepted  as  equivalent  to  a  disposi- 
tion for  the  systematic  achievement  of  pur- 
poses and,  consequently,  may  be  treated  as  an 
intellectual  qualification. 

101 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Accordingly,  spirit  is  here  understood  to 
be: 

That  disposition  for  intelligent 
effort  which  prompts  the  mind  to  the 
systematic  achievement  of  purposes. 

As  so  regarded,  spirit  first  manifests  it- 
self in  the  apparently  aimless  conduct  of  the 
infant,  gradually  develops  under  the  influence 
of  sensation,  habit,  thought  and  emotion  and 
culminates  in  enterprise,  industry  and  ambi- 
tion. 

Natural  spirit  is  that  aroused  by  the 
pleasure,  pain,  desire,  fear  or  curiosity  due  to 
the  influence  of  natural  causes  and  to  inherent 
propensities  and  corresponds  to  that  which  in- 
cites the  lower  animals  to  action. 

Acquired  spirit  is  that  which  arises  from 
habit,  study,  thought  and  the  stimulation  of 
mind  induced  by  pride  of  actual  achievement. 

102 


SPIRIT. 

In  view  of  the  evident  high  character  and 
importance  of  a  disposition  for  proper,  intel- 
ligent and  practical  action  the  neglect  w^ith 
which  the  spirit  of  practical  achievement  has 
been  treated  since  the  time  of  Aristotle  stands 
forth  as  a  remarkable  feature  of  philosophy. 
This  is  because  most  philosophers  are  so  ab- 
sorbed in  the  mere  exercise  of  their  mental  fac- 
ulties that  they  do  not  realize  the  importance 
of  practical  effort.  The  great  metaphysician 
Sir  William  Hamilton  admits  this,  in  effect, 

thus: 

*'But  it  is  not  knowledge, — it  is 
not  truth,— that  he  principally  seeks; 
he  seeks  the  exercise  of  his  faculties 
and  feelings;  and,  as  in  following 
after  the  one  he  exerts  a  greater  a- 
mount  of  pleasurable  energy  than  in 
taking  formal  possession  of  the 
thousand,  he  disdains  the  certainty 
of  the  many,  and  prefers  the  chances 
of  the  one.'* 


103 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  general  result  of  this  is  indicated  by 

the  historian  Buckle  as  follows: 

'*And  whoever  will  take  the 
pains  fairly  to  estimate  the  present 
condition  of  mental  philosophy, 
must  admit  that,  notwithstanding 
the  influence  it  has  always  exercised 
over  some  of  the  most  powerful 
minds,  and  through  them,  over  so- 
ciety at  large,  there  is,  nevertheless, 
no  other  study  wrhich  has  been  so 
zealously  prosecuted,  so  long  con- 
tinued, and  yet  remains  so  barren  of 
results." 

However  great  may  be  the  spirit  of  a 
man  it  is  certain  he  will  be  able  to  achieve  no 
intelligent  purpose  without  adequate  knowl- 
edge. 

As  an  object  of  philosophical  consider- 
ation knowledge  admits  of  two  distinct  classi- 
fications: 

One  of  these  is  based  upon  the  manner 
in  which  the  knowledge  has  been  acquired 
without  regard  to  the  use  that  may  be  made 

104 


KNOWLEDGE. 

of  it  and  is  that  usually  employed  by  metaphys- 
ical philosophers.  The  other  classification 
has  for  its  basis  the  immediate  application  of 
knowledge  as  a  means  for  achievement  of  pur- 
poses and  is  generally  used  by  practical  phil- 
osophers and  men  of  affairs. 

Considered  with  respect  to  the  manner 
of  its  acquisition,  knowledge  w^as  classed  by 
the  philosopher  Locke  in  effect  thus: 

Intuitive  Know^ledge: 

That  w^hich  is  acquired  w^ithout 
apparent  mental  effort,  such  as 
knowledge  of  the  axioms  of  mathe- 
matics and  such  as  know^ledge  that 
a  heavy  body  unsupported  will  fall 
towards  the  earth. 

Demonstrative  Knowledge: 

That  w^hich  is  gained  by  study 
and  thought  concerning  the  data  of 
intuitive  knowledge  and  concerning 
the  facts  and  truths  discovered 
through  observation  and  experi- 
ment. 

105 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Knowledge  considered  with  respect  to 
its  immediate  application  to  achievement  of 
practical  purposes  may  be  classified  as  follows: 

Theoretical  Know^ledge: 

That  which  is  acquired  in  the 
prosecution  and  completion  of  theo- 
retical purposes  and  w^hich  cannot 
be  immediately  applied  by  its  pos- 
sessor to  practical  affairs. 

Practical  Knowledge: 

That  which  by  virtue  of  ex- 
perience gained  through  its  previous 
use  may  readily  be  applied  by  its 
possessor  to  the  prosecution  and 
completion  of  practical  purposes. 

According  to  this  classification,  items  of 
practical  knowledge  may  be  likened  unto  serv- 
ants w^ho  are  under  immediate  call,  w^hile 
items  of  theoretical  know^ledge  are  like  out- 
door servants  w^ho  must  be  sent  for  and  even 
searched  for  and  who  may  not  be  found  until 
too  late. 

106 


KNOWLEDGE. 

It  is  well  known  that  certain  knowledge 
which  is  theoretical  to  one  man  may  be  prac- 
tical to  another  and  that  numerous  important 
items  of  knowledge  w^hich  at  some  time  in  the 
past  were  theoretical  to  all  who  possessed  them 
are  now  practical  to  many  men. 

Therefore,  the  classification  last  given 
would  seem  to  relate  less  to  the  knowledge 
than  to  the  general  state  of  the  mind  that  hap- 
pens to  possess  it  and  is,  of  course,  the  better; 
basis  for  a  consideration  of  knowledge  as  an 
intellectual  qualification  necessary  for  the 
achievement  of  practical  purposes. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  only  con- 
clusive evidence  of  the  ability  of  a  man  to  apply 
an  item  of  knowledge  to  achievement  of  a 
practical  purpose  is  the  fact  of  his  actually 
having  done  so. 

107 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore,  all  knowledge  may  be  regard- 
ed as  theoretical  until  made  practical  by  the 
prosecution  and  completion  of  appropriate 
purposes. 

Now,  any  purpose  with  the  knowledge 
acquired  through  its  completion  may  after- 
wards be  achieved  in  the  same  manner  pro- 
vided, of  course,  that  exactly  the  same  con- 
ditions obtain  and  the  same  means  are  avail- 
able. In  every  such  an  ideal  case  spirit  and 
knowledge  are  the  only  intellectual  qualifica- 
tions necessary  for  the  achievement  of  the  pur- 
pose. 

But  conditions  as  well  as  means  are  con- 
tinually undergoing  change  so  that  in  strict- 
ness it  seldom  if  ever  happens  that  a  purpose! 
can  be  achieved  by  spirit  and  knowledge  alone. 
Thus  it  is  that  ability  to  achieve  purposes  must 
involve  some  additional  qualification  of  mind. 

108 


DISCRETION. 

This  additional  qualification  is  that 
which  enables  the  mind  to  modify  means  and 
methods  according  to  the  changing  conditions 
of  practice  in  order  that  an  object  which  has 
been  accomplished  under  certain  conditions, 
with  certain  means  and  by  certain  methods, 
may  also  be  readily  accomplished  under  dif" 
f erent  conditions,  w^ith  different  means  and  by 
different  methods.  This  quality  is  often  re- 
fered  to  as  sagacity;  but  sagacity  is  generally 
understood  to  be  common  to  man  and  the 
lower  animals  and,  consequently,  does  not 
appear  to  have  sufficient  breadth  of  meaning. 
The  qualification  here  considered  is  more  pro- 
perly sagacity  improved  and  developed  by 
thought  concerning  the  data  of  knowledge. 
Accordingly,  it  will  be  given  the  more  compre- 
hensive title  of  Discretion  taken  in  the  sense 
indicated  by  the  following  description  by  the 

109 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

historian  Hume  in  his  "Inquiry  concerning  the 

Principles  of  Morals." 

"The  quality  most  necessary 
for  the  execution  of  any  useful  en- 
terprise is  discretion:  by  which  we 
carry  on  a  safe  intercourse  with  oth- 
ers, give  due  attention  to  our  own 
and  to  their  character,  weigh  each 
circumstance  of  the  business  w^e  un- 
dertake, and  employ  the  surest  and 
safest  means  for  the  attainment  of 
any  end  or  purpose." 

As  so  understood  Discretion  may  be  de- 
fined as: 

That  combination  of  proper- 
ties and  faculties  w^hich,  w^hen  unit- 
ed w^ith  the  proper  spirit  and  ade- 
quate know^ledge,  qualifies  the  mind 
for  the  achievement  of  purposes  re- 
lating to  practical  affairs. 

From  this  definition  it  follows  that  the  in- 
tellectual qualifications  that  constitute  intel- 
lectual efficiency  are:  spirit,  practical  knowl- 
edge and  discretion. 

110 


SPIRIT,  KNOWLEDGE  AND 
DISCRETION. 

In  order  that  a  man  may  justify  his  in- 
tellectual efficiency,  as  here  understood,  he 
must  not  only  possess  spirit,  knowledge  and 
discretion  but  he  must  also  manifest  those 
qualifications  with  proper  regard  for  the  rela- 
tions which  they  naturally  sustain  to  one  an- 
other. 

Should  the  spirit  of  a  man  transcend  his 
knowledge  or  his  discretion  his  intellectual  ef- 
ficiency might  be  diminished  rather  than  in- 
creased because  his  excess  of  spirit  w^^ould  be 
either  without  the  direction  of  knowledge  or 
the  control  of  discretion  and  he  would  tend  to 
overreach  himself.  This  is  the  normal  condi- 
tion of  the  youthful  mind  in  which  natural 
spirit  predominates  until  know^ledge  and  dis- 
cretion shall  have  been  acquired.  Also  it  is, 
of  course,  the  condition  of  those  mature  minds 

in  which  natural  and  acquired  spirit  outrange 

111 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge  and  discretion  and  bring  about  dis- 
aster. 

Should  a  man  acquire  knowledge  beyond 
the  scope  of  his  spirit  or  of  his  discretion,  then, 
either  his  spirit  would  not  or  his  discretion 
could  not  make  proper  use  of  the  surplus  so 
that  no  increase  in  his  intellectual  efficiency- 
could  manifest  itself  except  by  accident.  This 
is  why  the  achievements  of  some  men  often  do 
not  measure  up  to  their  extensive  learning. 

Should  discretion  be  in  excess  of  spirit  or 
of  knowledge  intellectual  efficiency  w^ould  not 
be  perceptibly  increased  because  the  surplus 
would  either  want  the  incentive  of  spirit  or  it 
would  be  without  the  data  of  knowledge. 
Thus  it  is  that  through  absence  of  initiative  or 
lack  of  education  men  do  not  or  cannot  take 
advantage  of  their  opportunities. 


112 


INTELLECTUAL  EFFICIENCY. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  and  of  the 
definitions  that  have  been  given: 

Intellectual  efficiency  is  here  understood 
to  be: 

A  proportionate  and  efficient 
combination  of  spirit,  practical 
knowledge  and  discretion. 


113 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

FORMS  OF  INTELLECTUAL 
EFFICIENCY. 

The  forms  under  which  intellectual  ef- 
ficiency manifests  itself  may  be  discussed  un- 
der the  two  general  heads  of  theoretical  ability 
and  practical  ability. 

Theoretical  ability  is  that  state  of  mind 
which  manifests  itself  exclusively  in  achieve- 
ment of  theoretical  purposes. 

Accordingly,  theoretical  ability  is  limited 
to  acquisition,  conservation  and  inculcation  of 
knowledge  without  regard  to  its  definite  or  im- 
mediate application. 

Theoretical  ability,  considered  with  re- 
spect to  its  purposes,  may  be  classed  into  spec- 
ulative, mathematical  and  experimental  abil- 
ity. 

114 


THEORETICAL  ABILITY. 

Speculative  ability  is  that  condition 
which  qualifies  the  mind  for  prosecution  of 
speculative  purposes. 

Mathematical  ability  is  ability  to  dis- 
cover, develop  and  explain  the  relations  of 
magnitude. 

Experimental  ability  is  that  which  mani- 
fests itself  in  discovery  by  study,  thought  and 
experiment,  of  the  relations  of  cause  and  ef- 
fect. 

Theoretical  ability  is  naturally  a  great 

source  of  know^ledge  for  use  as  a  means  for 

achievement  of  practical  purposes.        To  the 

extent  knowledge  from  that  source  can  be  so 

used  it  is  evident  that  theoretical  ability  itself 

may  be  treated  as  available  means;  and  to  the 

extent,  if  any,  that  such  know^ledge  can  not  be 

so  used  theoretical  ability  may  be  regarded  as 

a  trancendental  subject  that  needs  not  be  con- 
ns 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

sidered  here  further  than  especial  occasion 
may  require. 

Practical  ability  is  that  state  or  condition 
of  mind  which  qualifies  a  man  for  achievement 
of  practical  purposes;  or,  when  considered 
with  respect  to  its  practical  relation  to  theoret- 
ical ability: 

Practical  ability  is  that  condition  of  the 
mind  w^hich  manifests  itself  in  the  application 
of  theoretical  ability  and  other  available 
means  to  the  practical  affairs  of  life. 

Practical  ability  manifests  itself  under 
different  forms  vsrhich  are  here  distinguished 
as  dexterity,  skill  and  executive  ability  accord- 
ing to  the  character  of  the  individual,  the  na- 
ture of  the  purpose  and  the  means  and  meth-^ 
ods  available  for  its  achievement. 

The  practical  significance  of  each  of  these 


116 


DEXTERITY. 

forms  of  ability  as  developed  from  the  data  of 
observation,  experience,  history  and  science 
may  be  outlined  as  follovvrs: 

Dexterity  is  ability  to  achieve  a  practical 
purpose  solely  by  means  of  the  mental  and 
physical  capacities  and  faculties  of  the  individ- 
ual. Its  feeble  beginnings  are  observable  in 
the  infant  and  in  maturity  it  is  evidenced  by 
such  activities  as  talking,  singing,  wralking, 
running,  dancing,  climbing,  swimming,  etc. 
In  the  earlier  stages  of  human  existence  dexter- 
ity manifested  itself  by  cunning,  swiftness  and 
agility  in  escaping  danger  and  in  procuring 
food  and  comfort.  It  grew  with  the  knowl- 
edge gained  through  experience,  with  the  dis- 
cretion developed  by  primitive  processes  and 
with  the  practice  incited  by  fear  and  desire. 
Its  gradual  and  natural  development  gave  add- 


117 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ed  activity  and  strength  together  with  increas- 
ed ability  and  disposition  to  acquire  greater 
dexterity  still.  By  the  laws  of  natural  selec- 
tion it  instinctively  improved  along  lines  best 
suited  to  the  individual  and  his  environment, 
thus  forming  the  basis  of  the  safety  and  com- 
fort w^ithout  w^hich  systematic  progress  along 
other  lines  would  have  been  impracticable. 

But  although  dexterity  is  indispensable 
to  progress  it  has  serious  limitations.  For 
every  feat  must  be  within  the  feeble  powers  of 
the  individual  and  thus  when  taken  by  itself 
can  not  be  of  great  importance.  Moreover, 
he  who  relies  entirely  on  his  own  dexterity  can 
prosecute  but  a  single  rational  purpose  at  a 
time  so  that  the  achievements  of  such  a  man 
proceed  in  single  file  and  thus  present  a  weak 
formation.      Furthermore,  by  dexterity  alone 


118 


SKILL. 

the  purposes  of  different  men,  even  when  there 
is  no  conflict,  cannot  be  systematically  subor- 
dinated to  a  single  purpose  of  general  signifi- 
cance. Owing  to  these  limitations  it  could 
not  have  been  until  after  man  had  advanced! 
beyond  the  stage  of  simple  dexterity  that  his 
conquest  of  the  lower  animals  began. 

Skill  is  here  considered  as  ability  to 
achieve  a  purpose  by  intelligent  and  immedi- 
ate use  of  powers  of  inert  matter,  properties  of 
plants  and  faculties  and  propensities  of  ani- 
mals. As  so  understood,  skill  is  manifested 
in  the  use  of  tools,  in  expert  performance  upon 
instruments,  in  horticulture,  in  agriculture,  in 
successful  medical  practice  and  surgical  opera- 
tions, in  manufacture  and  use  of  machinery,  in 
management  and  use  of  domestic  animals  and 
in  numerous  other  vocations  requiring  the  use 


119 

-9- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  similar  means.  It  seems  to  have  had  its 
origin  in  the  necessity  for  weapons  of  offense 
and  defense  against  certain  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. Beginning  with  the  club,  ready  and  at 
hand,  skill,  by  means  of  the  knot  and  the  prop- 
erties of  wood  and  stone,  achieved  the  axe, 
thence  the  javelin  and  thence  the  bow  and  ar- 
rovvr.  The  making  and  use  of  these  weapons 
opened  up  a  wide  field  for  further  development 
of  dexterity  and  this  in  turn  broadened  the 
range  of  the  skill  that  had  made  it  possible. 

The  development  of  skill  facilitates  and 
encourages  its  ow^n  growth  and  thus  stimulates 
the  spirit  to  make  still  further  progress.  For 
this  reason,  and  from  necessity,  skill  at  an 
early  stage  discovered  the  properties  of  metals 
and  made  use  of  them,  first  in  improvement  of 
weapons  and  then  in  development  of  imple- 


120 


SKILL. 

ments  of  industry.  This  led  to  still  more  ef- 
fective weapons  and  implements  and  so  on 
continually  even  to  the  present  time.  The 
crude  w^eapons  and  implements  originally  de- 
veloped w^ere  practically  the  first  personal 
property  possessed  by  man. 

Thus  it  appears  that  skill,  by  giving  ex- 
istence and  value  to  personal  property  not  only 
gave  incentive  to  further  effort  for  improve- 
ment but  made  possible  the  progress  of  man 
far  beyond  the  point  to  which  dexterity  alone 
could  have  taken  him. 

But  skill,  though  superior  to  dexterity  as 
a  means  of  progress,  has  similar  limitations.- 
For  every  purpose  possible  to  a  man  of  skill 
must  have  his  personal  attention  to  the  detail, 
and  w^hile  he  may  use  the  powers  of  inert  mat- 
ter, the  properties  of  plants  and  the  faculties 


121 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  propensities  of  animals  he  still  must  de- 
pend continually  upon  his  own  abilities  and 
endurance.  Again,  he  who  relies  entirely  on 
his  ow^n  skill  can  seldom  prosecute  more  than 
a  single  purpose  at  a  time  and,  therefore,  can- 
not, as  a  rule,  consolidate  his  efforts.  More- 
over, since  skill  does  not  involve  ability  to 
manage  men  it  can  neither  prevent  the  prose- 
cution of  adverse  purposes  nor  cause  those 
which  do  not  conflict  to  merge  into  a  single 
purpose  of  magnified  importance.  Conse- 
quently, great  purposes  are  generally  beyond 
the  range  of  skill. 

Executive  ability  is  ability  to  achieve  pur- 
poses by  means  of  the  qualifications  of  intelli- 
gent agents.  Or,  it  may  be  more  explicitly 
stated  to  be  the  ability  to  cause  different  men 
to  subordinate  their  abilities  and  co-operate 


122 


EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

in   the  achievement   of   a  common  purpose. 

Until  man  by  his  skill  had  acquired  some 
personal  property  his  executive  ability,  no 
doubt,  vvras  limited  to  those  slight  traces  shown 
by  such  of  the  lower  animals  as  habitually  ex- 
ercise leadership  for  the  sake  of  food  and  safe- 
ty. But  when  men  had  realized  the  satisfac- 
tion to  be  derived  from  the  products  of  skill 
and  industry  there  naturally  arose  a  desire  for 
such  things  out  of  all  proportion  to  ability  or 
disposition  to  produce  them.  Thereupon,  and 
in  the  absence  of  all  direction  and  control, 
some  men  began  to  take  by  violence  and 
stealth  the  property  w^hich  had  been  acquired 
by  others  through  their  greater  skill  and  indus- 
try. This  naturally  produced  conflict  and 
confusion  among  the  purposes  of  different 
men,  the  only  escape  from  which  lay  in  caus- 


123 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  men  to  subordinate  their  conflicting  pur- 
poses to  a  general  state  of  social  order.  For 
reasons  given  skill  was  not  equal  to  this  task.' 
So  that,  by  bringing  about  a  situation  which 
required  intelligent  co-operation,  skill  had  con- 
tributed to  a  condition  with  which  it  could  not 
cope  and  for  w^hich  the  only  remedy  was  to  be 
found  in  the  development  of  executive  ability. 

Whence  it  appears  that  executive  ability 
had  its  origin  in  the  necessity  of  co-operation 
for  mutual  protection. 

Having  thus  been  forced  to  establish  a 
tolerable  state  of  social  order,  men  discovered 
the  power  of  systematic  co-operation  and 
thence  found  that  thereby  other  desirable  ob- 
jects entirely  beyond  the  range  of  dexterity 
and  skill  could  be  readily  accomplished.  Ac- 
cordingly, executive  ability  began  its  course 


124 


EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

and  gradually  became  as  it  is  today  the  genius 
of  social  and  industrial  progress. 

The  man  of  executive  ability,  out  of  his 
own  knowledge  and  discretion  or  from  the 
knowledge  and  discretion  of  other  men  deter- 
mines w^hether  the  objects  he  desires  are  prac- 
ticable and  is  able  to  select  and  govern  those 
who  can  select  and  govern  men  who  in  turn  are 
able  to  select  and  govern  others  and  so  on 
down  to  men  of  suitable  dexterity  and  skill. 

Such  a  man,  having  determined  upon  a 
practical  purpose,  prepares  the  proper  rules 
and  regulations,  selects  the  proper  men  and  by 
appeal  to  their  sensations,  emotions  and 
thoughts,  enforces  all  his  rules.  These  men, 
being  qualified,  select  and  apply  all  other 
means  and  the  object  is  accomplished  as  a  nat- 
ural consequence.      Thus  by  prescription  and 


125 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

enforcement  of  proper  rules  of  order  he  uses 
the  intellectual  qualifications  of  other  men  and 
so  conserves  his  time  and  energies. 

Should  this  man  intrust  the  enforcement 
of  his  rules  of  order  to  a  manager  of  suitable 
executive  ability  he  w^ould  have  a  state  of  self- 
enforcing  Law  and  Order  vsrhich  he  might 
leave  entirely  to  itself  and  thus  be  free  to  turn 
his  mind  to  something  else.  He  might  then 
repeat  the  process  and  by  means  of  other  man- 
agers carry  forward  several  important  pur- 
poses at  once  and  by  such  action  show  more 
practical  ability  than  would  be  shown  by  the 
prosecution  and  completion  of  a  single  purpose 
at  a  time. 

Then,  should  this  man  correlate  his  pur- 
poses and  under  self-enforcing  rules  and  regu- 
lations cause  his  managers  to  co-operate  so  as 


126 


EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

to  accomplish  an  object  of  magnified  impor- 
tance he  should  show  greater  executive  ability 
than  any  of  his  managers.  And,  similarly, 
each  manager  would  show  greater  ability  than 
would  be  show^n  by  any  man  of  dexterity  or  of 
skill  who  might  be  subject  to  his  control. 
Whence,  it  appears  that: 

The  most  efficient  form  of 
practical  ability  possible  to  any  man 
must  manifest  itself  in  executive 
ability  and  is  measured  by  the  mag- 
nitude and  scope  of  the  correlated 
states  of  self-enforcing  Law^  and  Or- 
der he  is  able  to  establish  and  main- 
tain. 

Since  executive  ability  must  manifest  it- 
self in  the  direction  and  control  of  men  its  ef- 
ficiency naturally  depends  upon  the  practical 
significance  of  what  is  known  as  Free  Will. 


127 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

FREE  WILL 
AND  EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

Advocates  of  Free  Will  insist  that  every 
man  is  conscious  of  his  own  Free  agency;  that 
this  consciousness,  being  without  exception 
cannot  be  denied  and  that,  as  a  consequence, 
human  action  is  independent  of  causes. 

Opponents  of  this  doctrine  contend  that 
the  mind  after  the  determination  of  a  purpose 
is  different  from  what  it  was  before;  that  this 
difference  represents  an  effect;  that  this  effect, 
by  the  Principle  of  Causation,  must  be  due  to 
the  action  of  some  cause  and  that  this  cause 
must  act  according  to  the  Principle  of  Regu- 
lation. 

128 


FREE  WILL. 

Others  hold  that  action  without  cause  is 
inconceivable;  that  cause  is  inconceivable  ex- 
cept as  the  effect  of  preceding  cause;  that,  con- 
sequently, Free  Will  is  not  a  proper  object  of 
thought  and  that  this  being  true,  Free-agency 
can  be  neither  proved  nor  disproved  by  reason- 
ing from  abstract  propositions. 

This  purely  metaphysical  aspect  of  Free 
Will  is  clearly  set  forth  by  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton thus: 

**It  would,  therefore  have  been 
better  to  show  articulately  that  Lib- 
erty and  Necessity  are  both  incom- 
prehensible, as  both  beyond  the  lim- 
its of  legitimate  thought;  but  that 
though  the  Free-agency  of  Man 
cannot  be  speculatively  proved, 
neither  can  it  be  speculatively  dis- 
proved." 

Considering  Free  Will  in  the  abstract  this 

quotation  seems  unansw^erable  and,  therefore, 

it  will  be  accepted  as  true, 

129 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Whence,  if  the  problem  of  Free  Will  is 
possible  its  solution  must  be  reached  through 
the  known  facts  and  conditions  of  human  con- 
duct or  action. 

Should  the  spirit  of  a  man  be  entirely  iso- 
lated from  the  influences  of  his  sensations  and 
emotions  and  should  he  then  take  action  there 
would  be  conclusive  evidence  of  Free  Will. 
But  the  nearest  approach  to  this  condition  is 
that  of  sleep  in  which  isolation  from  sensation 
and  emotion  is  not  knowm  to  be  complete. 

In  the  event  it  could  be  proved  that  a  man 
had  been  influenced  equally  in  two  different 
directions  at  the  same  time  and  that  he  had 
taken  one  course  rather  than  the  other  then  it 
might  be  conceded  that  he  had  exercised  Free 
Will  in  determining  upon  his  action.  While 
it  is  conceivable  that  such  a  condition  might 

130 


FREE  WILL. 

exist  it  would  be  impossible  to  prove  it  because 
the  action  of  a  man  may  be  influenced  by  caus- 
es of  which  even  he  might  not  be  conscious  and 
of  w^hich  an  observer  could  have  no  know^l- 
edge. 

Were  it  possible  to  prove  that  the  same 
man  under  the  same  conditions  had  acted  dif- 
ferently at  diflFerent  times  then  the  existence 
of  Free  Will  would  have  been  demonstrated. 
But  every  man  is  continually  undergoing  men- 
tal and  physical  changes  so  that  no  man  re- 
mains exactly  the  same  from  time  to  time. 
Also,  the  conditions  by  which  the  conduct  or 
action  of  any  and  every  man  may  be  affected 
are  likewise  undergoing  continual  change. 
Consequently,  in  the  nature  of  things,  the 
same  man  cannot  be  placed  under  the  same 
conditions  at  different  times. 


131 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

From  the  considerations  set  forth  it  ap- 
pears that  there  is  no  particular  fact  of  expe- 
rience available  as  conclusive  evidence  of  Free 
Will. 

This  howrever,  does  not  disprove  the  doc- 
trine of  Free  Will;  it  merely  shows  the  inabil- 
ity of  man  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
Free-agency  from  any  particular  fact  w^ithin 
the  range  of  his  possible  experience. 

But  although  the  existence  of  Free  Will 
cannot  be  proved  by  particular  fact,  neither 
can  it  be  so  disproved. 

The  truth  of  this  is  readily  shovsm  by  the 
self-evident  proposition  that: 

An  apparent  absence  of  Free 
Will  may  be  caused  by  an  act  of 
Free  Will  itself. 

Assuming  the  existence  of  Free  Will  the 
practical  significance  of  this  proposition  may 
be  illustrated  by  Executive  Ability  which  has 

132 


FREE  WILL  AND  EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

been  shown  to  be  the  most  efficient  form  of 
practical  ability. 

A  man  of  Free  Will  and  of  pre-eminent 
executive  ability  might  conceivably  establish  a 
perfect  self-enforcing  organization  involving 
many  employes. 

Now,  the  Free  Will  of  every  employe, 
while  at  work,  would  have  been  subordinated 
to  the  general  state  of  Law  and  Order  estab- 
lished by  the  chief  executive. 

In  course  of  time  the  chief  executive,  in 
the  exercise  of  his  Free  Will  and  with  confi- 
dence in  his  self-enforcing  rules  and  regula- 
tions, might  leave  the  organization  entirely  to 
itself  and  devote  his  energies  to  other  affairs. 

Under  such  conditions  it  is  conceivable 
that  the  organization,  in  virtue  of  its  practi- 
cally perfect  state  of  Law  and  Order,  might 
continue  indefinitely  its  operations  as  before. 

133 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

And  the  situation  would  be  the  same  even 
though  the  chief  executive  had  been  removed 
by  death. 

In  this  illustration  the  only  evidence  of 
Free  Will  would  be  that  deduced  from  the 
state  of  Law^  and  Order  in  the  organization 
taken  as  a  whole. 

This  means  that: 

Free  Will  does  not  require  its 
ow^n  direct  or  special  manifestation. 

In  addition  to  this  it  has  been  shown,  in 

effect,  that: 

Executive  ability,  the  highest 
degree  of  practical  ability,  is  meas- 
ured by  the  magnitude  and  scope  of 
the  correlated  states  of  self-enforc- 
ing Law^  and  Order  it  is  able  to  estab- 
lish and  maintain. 

Whence  the  proposition  that: 

The  greater  the  executive  abil- 
ity, the  less  should  be  the  special 
manifestations  of  Free  Will. 

134 


FREE  WILL  AND  EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

This  proposition  is  justified  by  experi- 
ence which  shows  that  the  man  who  believes 
he  has  Free  Will  and  persists  in  its  special  man- 
ifestations is  w^anting  in  executive  ability  and 
not  qualified  for  achievement  of  great  pur- 
poses. 

But  while  the  problem  of  Free  Will  can- 
not be  solved  from  particular  fact  the  general 
predominance  of  good  purposes  indicates,  if  it 
does  not  prove,  that  even  though  man  may  be 
by  nature  a  free  agent  he  is  practically  not  so 
because  of  the  influences  to  which  he  is  con- 
tinually subjected  and  which  effectively  con- 
trol his  conduct  as  a  whole.  That  is,  man  be- 
ing persistently  driven  to  advance  his  ulti- 
mate welfare,  his  will  cannot,  in  practice, 
be  recognized  as  absolutely  free. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  the  contro- 
versial problem  of  Free  Will  it  must  be  admit- 

135 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

ted  that  executive  ability  is  based  upon  the 
proposition  that: 

In  order  to  induce  a  man  of  ade- 
quate intellectual  efficiency  to 
achieve  a  given  purpose  it  is  only 
necessary  to  provide  him  writh  suit- 
able means  and  subject  his  sensa- 
tions and  thoughts  to  certain  influ- 
ences. 

It  must  be  conceded  that  there  are  innum- 
erable indications  that  this  proposition  is  not 
true.  None  of  these  indications,  however,  is 
of  any  practical  significance  because,  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  there  cannot  be  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  each  did  not  arise  either  from  men- 
tal inaptitude  or  from  extraneous  influences. 

Were  the  proposition  not  practical  then 
it  is  certain  that  no  man  could  be  depended  up- 
on to  perform  an  allotted  task;  that  men  could 
not  be  subjected  to  discipline  and  that,  conse- 
quently, the  achievement  of  every  purpose  re- 

136 


FREE  WILL  AND  EXECUTIVE  ABILITY. 

quiring  their  systematic  co-operation  would  be 
impracticable. 

That  the  proposition  is  practical  is  shown 
by  the  uniform  and  unquestioned  efficiency  of 
executive  ability  in  the  achievement  of  the 
numerous  great  and  important  purposes  which 
involve  systematic  co-operation  of  many  men 
and  which  mark  the  course  of  industrial,  com- 
mercial and  social  progress. 

Whence,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  is 
not  the  slightest  practical  objection  to  the  pro- 
position that: 

Any  man  unrestrained  and  of 
adequate  ability,  w^ith  suitable 
means  and  with  his  sensations  and 
thoughts  subjected  to  certain  influ- 
ences may  be  intrusted  with  the 
achievement  of  a  certain  purpose 
with  the  same  confidence  that  fuel 
at  a  proper  temperature  in  the  open 
air  may  be  depended  upon  to  pro- 
duce combustion. 

137 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  application  of  this  proposition  to  the 
practical  affairs  of  life  is  attended  with  much 
difficulty;  not  because  it  is  untrue  but  because, 
at  the  present  stage  of  human  progress,  the 
abilities  and  aptitudes  of  different  men  and  the 
influences  to  which  they  w^ill  respond  are  so 
largely  matters  of  conjecture. 

This  condition,  however,  naturally  im- 
proves as  men  learn  by  experience  that  their 
individual  interests  are  best  subserved  by  co- 
operation for  advancement  of  the  common 
welfare. 


138 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  X. 

THE  WISDOM  OF  MAN. 

The  term  Wisdom,  or  its  equivalent  in 
dead  and  living  languages,  taken  in  its  greatest 
sense,  has  aWays  been  used  to  denote  the  high- 
est degree  of  intellectual  excellence. 

But  although  authorities  are  generally 
agreed  in  regard  to  wisdom  iii  the  abstract 
there  aWays  have  been  wide  diflFerences  of 
opinion  concerning  the  nature  and  practical 
significance  of  that  most  excellent  condition  of 
the  mind. 

Therefore,  it  behooves  any  one  who  may 
venture  to  form  an  adequate  conception  of  wis- 
dom to  consider  and  compare  the  conceptions 
of  others;  to  reject  those  that  are  demonstrably 

139 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

deficient  and  then  to  establish  his  own  concep- 
tion with  proper  regard  to  those  which  may  re- 
main. 

It  is  written  in  the  Book  of  Proverbs  that: 

**For  wisdom  is  better  than  ru- 
bies; and  all  the  things  that  may  be 
desired  are  not  to  be  compared  to 
it." 

Thus  did  Solomon  not  only  declare  w^is- 
dom  to  be  the  highest  degree  of  intellectual 
excellence  but  also  gave  to  it  pre-eminence 
above  all  other  things. 

In  the  Book  of  Proverbs  there  is  also  writ- 
ten: 

"Go  to  the  ant,  thou  sluggard; 
consider  her  vvrays  and  be  w^ise." 

This  shows  that  Solomon  included  in  his 
conception  of  w^isdom  a  disposition  to  effort  as 
manifested  by  certain  of  the  lowrer  animals  in 
procuring  their  safety,  food  and  comfort. 

140 


SOLOMON  AND  SOCRATES. 

And  Solomon  himself  had  this  disposi- 
tion to  a  high  degree,  because  history  shows 
that  he  valued  wisdom,  sought  it  and  even 
prayed  his  God  to  give  it  to  him  in  order  that 
he  might  judge  between  good  and  bad  and  rule 
his  people  well.  That  is,  he  valued  wisdom 
and  sought  it  as  a  means  for  the  systematic  ad- 
vancement of  human  w^elf  are. 

But  although  the  w^ise  king  fully  recog- 
nized a  disposition  for  effort  or  action  as  an 
element  of  w^isdom  he  did  not  fail  to  realize  the 
importance  of  keeping  that  disposition  under 
proper  direction  and  control,  as  is  shown  by 
the  Proverb: 

**Seest  thou  a  man  w^ise  in  his 
ow^n  conceit?  there  is  more  hope  of  a 
fool  than  of  him." 

Socrates,     often     called     the    greatest     of 

moral  philosophers,  believed  wisdom  to  be  so 

141 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

far  beyond  the  intellectual  excellence  possible 
to  man  that: 

**The  wisest   man   is   he  who 
know^s  there  is  no  wisdom  in  him." 

But  during  the  trial  at  w^hich  he  was  con- 
demned to  death  for  his  doctrines  he  declared 
that  he  w^as  guided  by  a  Daemon  or  voice  di- 
vine wrhich  often  forbade  him  to  act  but  which 
never  prompted  him  to  any  undertaking. 

Thus  it  appears  that  while  Socrates  rec- 
ognized the  greatness  and  excellence  of  wis- 
dom and  realized  the  value  of  prudence  as  one 
of  its  elements  he  failed  to  inspire  it  w^ith  the 
disposition  for  practical  effort  or  action  upon 
w^hich  Solomon  had  laid  such  stress. 

Consequently,  since  a  disposition  to  prac- 
tical action  for  the  benefit  of  others  is  unques- 
tionably a  part  of  intellectual  excellence,  the 


142 


PLATO. 

conception  which  Socrates  had  of  wisdom  was 
evidently  inferior  to  that  of  the  Jewish  king. 

Plato,  a  disciple  of  Socrates  and  regarded 
as  the  greatest  idealist  of  any  age,  held  that 
such  perfections  as  man  may  happen  to  possess 
are  due  to  wisdom  which  he  treated  as  the  fruit 
of  reason.  Thus,  by  confining  wisdom  to  the 
limits  of  reason  he  failed  to  give  it  a  disposition 
for  action  which  has  no  definite  relation  to  rea- 
son but  is  a  distinct  qualification  of  the  mind. 
He  also  held  that  all  knowledge  wrhich  is  based 
on  the  evidence  of  the  senses  is  mere  opinion 
which  in  his  own  opinion  may  be  true  but 
might  be  false  and  that,  therefore,  all  true  wis- 
dom must  be  reasoned  out  from  self  evident 
propositions.  Thus  he  deprived  wisdom  of 
the  benefit  of  experience.  Consequently,  the 
great  idealist,  by  limiting  wisdom  to  reason 


143 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  denying  the  evidence  of  the  senses  depriv- 
ed it,  in  effect,  of  all  practical  significance. 

Therefore,  it  seems  clear  that  the  concep- 
tion of  Solomon  concerning  wisdom  was  much 
superior  to  that  of  Plato. 

Aristotle,  a  pupil  of  Plato  and  generally 
regarded  as  the  greatest  of  ancient  philos- 
ophers, held  that  all  rational  processes  must  be 
based  on  observation  and  experience  and  that 
X  the  highest  degree  of  intellectual  excellence 
is  founded  upon  virtue  which  must  manifest  it- 
self in  prudent  effort  or  action.  He  thus  gave 
to  wisdom  the  practical  features  w^hich  had 
been  withheld  by  the  extreme  prudence  of 
Socrates  and  by  the  idealism  of  Plato. 

Thus  it  w^ould  seem  that  the  conception 
of  wisdom  reached  by  Aristotle  was  practical- 
ly the  same  as  that  of  Solomon. 


144 


KANT. 

Immanuel  Kant,  probably  the  most  pro- 
found metaphysical  philosopher  of  modern 
times  held  that: 

"Perceptions  without  notions 
are  blind  and  notions  without  per- 
ceptions are  void." 

But,  while  he  thus  recognized  the  validity  of 

experience  he  stated  that: 

* 'Wisdom  is  the  final  purpose 
of  human  reason." 

He,  therefore,  made  wisdom  originate  in 
reason,  as  Plato  had  done,  and  as  a  con- 
sequence, he  did  not  recognize  the  prime  sig- 
nificance of  an  adequate  disposition  for  prac- 
tical effort  or  action. 

Accordingly,  the  conception  wrhich  was 
held  by  Kant  w^ith  respect  to  wisdom  w^as  evi- 
dently inferior  to  that  of  Solomon  and  even  to 
that  of  Aristotle. 


145 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Within  the  last  century  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton, the  eminent  Scottish  metaphysician, 
stated  his  conception  of  intellectual  excellence 
to  be  as  follows: 

*Thus,  in  the  actualities  of 
social  life,  each  man,  instead  of  be- 
ing solely  an  end  to  himself, — in- 
stead of  being  able  to  make  every- 
thing subordinate  to  that  full  and 
harmonious  development  of  his  in- 
dividual faculties,  in  wrhich  his  full 
perfection  and  his  true  happiness 
consist,— is,  in  general,  compelled  to 
degrade  himself  into  the  mean  or  in- 
strument towards  the  accomplish- 
ment of  some  end,  external  to  him- 
self, and  for  the  benefit  of  others." 

Thus  it  appears  that  in  the  estimation  of 
a  leading  modern  philosopher  the  systematic 
advancement  of  the  general  welfare  of  man- 
kind is  so  far  from  being  an  indication  of  in- 
tellectual excellence  that  it  should  be  regarded 
as  evidence  of  mental  degradation. 

And    within    comparatively    recent    years 

146 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  WISDOM. 

this  remarkable  notion  concerning  intellectual 
excellence  has  been  indorsed  by  a  prominent 

educator  with  the  statement  that: 

**The  man  who  pursues  knowl- 
edge simply  because  it  is  useful  is  on 
the  same  low  plane  as  the  man  w^ho 
f  ollow^s  honesty  because  it  is  the  best 
policy." 

Such  opinions  of  intellectual  excellence 
can  be  justified  by  neither  science,  philosophy 
nor  religion.  They  arise,  no  doubt,  from  the 
natural  propensity  of  man  to  believe  those 
things  which  he  wishes  to  be  true  and  from  the 
tendency  of  every  one  to  form  his  opinions  of 
practical  affairs  from  the  standpoint  of  his  own 
mental  aptitude.  However  that  may  be  it  is 
certain  that  the  conceptions  of  Solomon  and 
Aristotle  are  superior  to  notions  of  w^isdom 
based  on  the  last  two  opinions. 

Coming  down  to  the  present  time  the 
leading  definitions  given  in  the  standard  dic- 

147 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tionaries  may  fairly  be  accepted  as  showing 
the  different  conceptions  of  wisdom  now  cur- 
rent. 

According    to    one    of    these    authorities 

w^isdomis: 

''Knowledge  with  the  capacity 
to  make  due  use  of  it." 

Now,  a  mind  limited  to  knowledge  with 
a  capacity  to  make  due  use  of  it  is  manifestly 
inferior  to  one  with  the  same  knowledge  and 
capacity  but  w^ith  a  disposition  to  apply  those 
qualities  to  the  advancement  of  human  w^el- 
fare. 

Therefore,  the  definition  does  not  repre- 
sent the  highest  degree  of  intellectual  excel- 
lence. 

By  another  authority  w^isdom  is  defined: 

"The  pow^er  of  discerning  w^hat 
is  true  and  right  or  w^hat  is  conduc- 
ive to  the  highest  interests;  discern- 
ment of  the  real  characteristics  and 
relations  of  conduct." 

148 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  WISDOM. 

Here,    it   will   be   observed,    no   considera- 
tion is  given  to  a  disposition  for  effort  and, 
consequently,  the  definition  is  not  complete. 
Another   standard    authority   defines   wis- 
dom as: 

"The  povsrer  or  faculty  of  form- 
ing the  fittest  and  truest  judgment 
of  any  matter  presented  for  con- 
sideration ;  a  combination  of  discern- 
ment, discretion,  and  sagacity,  or 
similar  qualities  and  faculties,  invol- 
ving also  a  certain  amount  of  knowl- 
edge, especially  the  knowledge  of 
men  and  things  gained  by  experi- 
ence." 

Since  this  definition  does  not  include  a 
disposition  for  action  it  does  not,  for  reasons 
already  stated,  express  the  highest  degree  of 
intellectual  excellence. 

According  to  still  another  authority  wis- 
dom is: 

"Knowledge  united  with  a  dis- 
position to  use  it  for  the  best  pur- 
poses." 

149 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

While  this  definition  recognizes  a  disposi- 
tion for  action  as  an  element  of  wisdom  it  is 
deficient  because  knowledge  does  not  always 
include  the  discretion  necessary  for  the  proper 
adaptation  of  effort  or  action  to  unexpected 
changes  in  practical  conditions. 

Now,  rejecting  all  conceptions  and  def- 
initions that  have  been  shown  to  be  deficient 
there  remain  available  for  the  establishment 
of  an  adequate  definition  of  wisdom  as  the 
highest  degree  of  intellectual  excellence  only 
the  conceptions  of  Solomon  and  Aristotle. 

Accordingly,  and  w^ith  proper  regard  for 
those  high  conceptions  human  wisdom  is  here 
understood  to  be: 

That  state  or  condition  of  mind 
which  qualifies  a  man  in  disposition 
and  ability  for  the  systematic  ad- 
vancement of  human  welfare. 


150 


IMPLICIT  DEFINITION  OF  WISDOM. 

It  has  been  shown  that  systematic  ad- 
vancement of  the  welfare  of  man  originates 
in  and  is  determined  by  his  own  conduct;  and 
it  must  be  admitted  that  it  is  only  through  the 
intelligent  achievement  of  good  purposes  that 
the  systematic  advancement  of  human  welfare 
by  the  agency  of  man  is  practicable. 

Therefore,  wisdom,  in  its  relation  to  pur- 
pose may  be  implicitly  defined  as: 

That  state  or  condition  of  mind 
which  qualifies  a  man  in  disposition 
and  ability  for  the  systematic 
achievement  of  good  purposes. 

Since  w^isdom  involves  both  disposition 
and  ability  for  achievement  it  must  include  in- 
tellectual efficiency  which  has  been  shown  to 
be  a  proportionate  and  efficient  combination 
of  spirit,  practical  knowledge  and  discretion 
regardless  of  any  distinctions  of  good  and  evil. 


151 
11- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore,  wisdom  may  be  regarded  as 
intellectual  efficiency  united  with  ability  to 
distinguish  good  from  evil  purposes  and  a  dis- 
position to  avoid  the  evil  and  achieve  the  good. 

That  qualification  which  enables  the 
mind  to  distinguish  good  from  evil  purposes  is 
generally  knowrn  as  judgment. 

This,    in   view   of   the   definition   given   of 

good  and  evil  purposes,  means  that: 

Judgment  is: 

Ability  to  determine  whether 
the  achievement  of  a  purpose  will  be 
sure  in  the  end  to  advance  the  w^el- 
fare  of  mankind. 

But  it  is  certain  that  even  though  a  man 
may  have  intellectual  efficiency  and  a  fair 
degree  of  judgment  he  w^ill  often  achieve  pur- 
poses which  he  must  realize  are  inimical  to 
the  future  w^elf are  of  himself  and  others.  This 
is,  of  course,  because  the  allurements  of  temp- 

152 


JUDGMENT. 

tation  or  other  influences  prevent  their  judg- 
ment from  giving  proper  direction  to  the  spirit 
of  achievement  which  is  an  essential  part  of 
intellectual  efficiency. 

Thus  it  appears  that  between  judgment 
and  spirit  there  is  no  definite  affinity. 

Experience  teaches  that  judgment  can  be 
acquired  only  by  observation  of  the  effect  of 
completed  purposes  upon  the  w^elfare  and 
progress  of  man.  Consequently,  it  must  be  the 
result  of  study  and  thought  concerning  the  data 
of  knowledge  and  partake  of  the  nature  of  dis- 
cretion. But,  since  men  achieve  evil  purposes 
against  what  must  be  their  better  judgment 
it  is  clear  that  judgment  has  no  practical  re- 
lation to  either  know^ledge  or  discretion. 

Therefore,  judgment  may  be  treated  as 
a  distinct  intellectual  qualification. 

153 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

While  the  spirit  of  a  man  may  prompt 
him  to  achieve  a  purpose  which  he  knows  or 
has  reason  to  believe  is  evil  it  is  certain  that  he 
may  be  depended  upon  not  to  do  so  w^ith  an 
adequate  degree  of  that  excellent  qualification 
of  mind  known  as: 

Virtue,  which  is: 

A  disposition  to  make  the  best 
use  of  available  means  for  advance- 
ment of  the  w^elfare  of  mankind. 

According  to  this  definition  a  man  of  ad- 
equate virtue  not  only  w^ill  endeavor  to  avoid 
all  evil  but  he  w^ill  make  every  effort  to  achieve 
every  good  purpose  within  the  range  of  his 
opportunities  and  abilities. 

This  means  that  to  the  extent  that  natural 
or  acquired  spirit  is  subjected  to  the  dictates 
of  good  judgment  it  becomes  identical  with 
virtue. 


154 


EXPLICIT  DEFINITION  OF  WISDOM. 

In  view  of  what  has  been  stated,  The 
Wisdom  of  Man  may  be  explicitly  defined  as 
a  combination  of  the  following  intellectual 
qualifications: 

Practical  know^ledge: 

That  which  is  immediately 
available  for  achievement  of  the  pur-i 
poses  of  man. 

Discretion : 

Ability  to  make  efficient  use 
of  means  under  changing  conditions 
of  practice. 

Judgment: 

Ability  to  distinguish  good 
from  evil  purposes. 

Virtue: 

Disposition  to  make  the  best 
and  greatest  use  of  all  obtainable 
means  for  achievement  of  good  pur- 
poses. 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER  XI. 

DEGREES  OF  HUMAN  WISDOM. 

The  satisfaction  derived  from  intellectual 
exercise  has  led  many  great  men  to  attach 
more  importance  to  the  mere  pursuit  of  knowl- 
edge than  to  its  possession  or  its  use. 

Thus,  Malebranche  stated  that: 

'*If  I  held  truth  captive  in  my 
hand,  I  should  open  my  hand  and  let 
it  fly,  in  order  that  I  might  again  pur- 
sue and  capture  it." 

This  was  emphasized  by  Lessing  thus: 

"Did  the  Almighty,  holding  in 
his  right  hand  Truth  and  in  his  left 
Search  after  Truth,  deign  to  tender 
me  the  one  I  might  prefer, — in  all 
humility,  but  without  hesitation,  I 
should  request  Search  after  Truth." 

This  sentiment  seems  to  have  culminated 

in  the  mind  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  w^ho  re- 

156 


WISDOM  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

cognized  it  as  follows: 

**Now  the  various  opinions 
which  prevail  concerning  the  com- 
parative utility  of  human  sciences 
and  studies,  have  all  arisen  from  two 
errors. 

'*The  first  of  these  consists  in 
viewing  man,  not  as  an  end  unto 
himself  y  but  merely  as  a  mean  or- 
ganized for  the  sake  of  something 
out  of  himself;  and  under  this  partial 
view  of  human  destination,  those 
branches  of  knowledge  obtain  ex- 
clusively the  name  of  useful,  which 
tend  to  qualify  a  human  being  to  act 
the  lowly  part  of  a  dexterous  in- 
strument. 

**The  second  and  the  more  dan- 
gerous of  these  errors,  consists  in  re- 
garding the  cultivation  of  our  fac- 
ulties as  subordinate  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  knowledge,  instead  of  regard- 
ing  the  possession  of  knowledge  as 
subordinate  to  the  cultivation  of  our 
faculties." 

The    context    shows    that    he    limits    the 

cultivation  of  the  mental  faculties  to  the  pur- 

157 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

suit  of  knowledge  without  regard  to  its  practi- 
cal application  and  contains  the  following  quo- 
tation from  Aristotle: 

"The  arts  and  sciences  are  pow^- 
ers,  but  every  power  exists  only  for 
the  sake  of  action ;  the  end  of  philos- 
ophy, therefore,  is  not  knowledge, 
but  the  energy  conversant  about 
know^ledge." 

The  meaning  of  Aristotle  is  here  exactly 
the  opposite  of  that  attributed  to  him  by  the 
eminent  Scottish  philosopher.  For,  the  arts 
and  sciences  are  powers  only  as  sources  of 
knowledge  so  that  the  Grecian  sage  meant  that 
know^ledge  exists  only  for  the  sake  of  action  or 
application.  Moreover,  energy  may  be  con- 
versant about  knovvrledge  not  only  in  its  ac- 
quisition but  often  to  a  greater  extent  in  its 
use.  Knowing  this,  the  foremost  exponent  of 
practical  action,  instead  of  limiting  philosophy 
to  the  pursuit,  naturally  vvrould  have  extended 

158 


WISDOM  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

it  to  the  application  of  knowledge.  And  that 
this  is  what  he  intended  is  shown  by  the  con- 
sideration that  otherwise  he  could  not  consis- 
tently have  maintained  that  the  gods,  who 
were  supposed  to  possess  all  knowledge: 

*'Are  happy  because  they  are 
active." 

Now,  it  is  manifest  that  the  quotation 
from  Malebranche,  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
wisdom  as  the  highest  degree  of  intellectual 
excellence,  might  be  discredited  by  any  true 
follower  of  Solomon  or  Aristotle  with  the 
statement  that: 

Having  captured  truth  I  would 
not  let  it  fly  and  waste  my  energies 
in  taking  it  again ;  but  I  would  hold 
it,  apply  it  to  the  achievement  of 
good  purposes  and  thus  promote 
the  welfare  of  myself  and  others. 

The  pursuit  of  knowledge  w^ithout  any 
regard  to  its  possession  or  its  use  is  practically 

159 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

equivalent  to  the  working  out  of  an  amusing 
puzzle.  This  being  true,  the  man  who  con- 
fines himself  to  such  pursuits  follow^s  know^l- 
edge  only  to  the  point  of  practical  significance 
and  then,  by  stopping  short,  places  a  limitation 
on  his  w^isdom.  Thus  it  is  that  many  learned 
men  through  their  dislike  for  practical  effort 
are  far  from  being  wise. 

Fortunately,  however,  many  brilliant 
men  w^ith  a  disposition  to  pursue  knowledge 
w^ithout  regard  to  its  practical  application  not 
only  capture  it  but  also  imprison  it  carefully 
in  their  writings.  To  this  is  due  a  great  part 
of  that  immense  fund  of  learning  which,  hav- 
ing been  organized  for  convenient  reference 
in  the  encyclopaedias  and  text  books,  is  ac- 
cessible to  all  men  as  a  most  important  means 
for  the  achievement  of  human  purposes. 


160 


WISDOM  AND  KNOWLEDGE. 

Thus  it  appears  that  while  a  disposition 
for  mental  exercise  without  a  practical  object 
limits  the  wisdom  of  the  individual  it  tends 
to  increase  the  total  wisdom  possible  to  man. 

Again,  know^ledge,  in  addition  to  its  great 
potential  value  may  upon  occasion  be  made 
highly  ornamental  even  though  its  possessor 
may  have  little  or  no  ability  for  its  practical 
application. 

Wherefore,  many  men  who  aspire  to  w^is- 
dom  confine  their  efforts  to  theoretical  knowl- 
edge, believing  that  it  alone  w^ill  bring  to  them 
the  highest  degree  of  intellectual  excellence. 
This  is  also  true  of  those  vainglorious  men 
who  would  conceal  from  themselves  and  others 
their  want  of  disposition  for  practical  effort. 
Thus,  knowledge,  being  mistaken  for  wrisdom, 
discretion   and  judgment  are   neglected   and 


161 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

virtue  is  often  excluded  by  a  misguided  am- 
bition. 

This  pride  of  theoretical  knowledge  has 
always  been  widely  prevalent  and  must  be 
w^hat  led  Solomon  to  condemn  conceit,  gave 
excessive  prudence  to  the  Daemon  of  Socrates 
and  caused  that  remarkable  tendency  of  the 
philosophers  of  every  enlightened  age  to  neg- 
lect the  vital  element  of  spirit  or  disposition 
for  practical  action  in  forming  their  concep- 
tions of  wisdom. 

Discretion,  being  native  sagacity  im- 
proved and  developed  by  thought  concerning 
the  data  of  know^ledge,  is  difficult  to  attain. 
This  is  chiefly  because  it  involves  ability  to 
make  ready  adjustments  of  means  and  meth- 
ods to  new  and  impending  conditions.  This 
ability,  to  any  notable  extent,  can  be  acquired 
only  by  carefully  preserved  experience  gained 

162 


WISDOM,  DISCRETION,  JUDGMENT. 

through  persistent  application  of  means  and 
this  requires  labor,  fortitude,  self  denial,  prac- 
tical knowledge  and  fine  discrimination  of 
means  as  well  as  method.  Since  all  these  qual- 
ities are  seldom  found  combined  in  a  single 
person  a  man  of  large  discretion  is  the  excep- 
tion rather  than  the  rule.  Thus,  the  difficul- 
ties of  discretion  constitute  a  serious  limita- 
tion to  the  wisdom  of  every  man. 

The  judgment  of  any  man  w^ith  respect  to 
a  given  purpose  depends  primarily  upon  his 
ability  to  predict: 


\ 


1 .  The  effect  upon  his  own  pres- 
ent w^elfare. 

2.  The  effect  upon  the  present 
w^elfare  of  others. 

3.  The  ultimate  effect  upon  his 
own  w^elfare. 

4.  The  ultimate  effect  upon  the 
welfare  of  others. 

163 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Now,  it  is  certain  that  beyond  simple  pur- 
poses comparable  to  those  manifested  by  some 
of  the  lower  animals  no  man  can  foretell  with 
precision  even  the  immediate  effects  of  an 
achievement.  In  addition  to  this,  even  w^ere  a 
man  able  to  predict  each  particular  effect  of 
the  achievement  of  a  purpose  he  must  prede- 
termine the  final  general  effect  in  order  that 
his  judgment  might  be  complete  and  this  is 
seldom  possible  except  in  the  ordinary  recur- 
rent purposes  of  life. 

These  conditions  place  a  serious  limita- 
tion on  the  vsrisdom  of  every  man  with  the  re- 
sult that  the  best  he  can  do  is  to  accept  such 
rules  of  judgment  as  have  been  sanctioned  by 
the  experience  of  custom  and  by  authority  of 
Statute  even  though  the  propriety  of  many  of 
these  are  regarded  as  problematical. 


164 


WISDOM  AND  VIRTUE. 

Virtue  is  the  vital  quality  of  human  wis- 
dom. But  it  must  be  possessed  exactly  to  the 
right  extent.  For,  if  it  is  deficient  intellectual 
efficiency  lies  dormant  and  judgment  is  futile; 
while  if  it  transcends  the  limits  of  judgment  it 
is  apt  to  defeat  its  purposes  and  bring  about 
confusion  and  disaster.  This  delicate  adjust- 
ment requires  not  only  suitable  know^ledge, 
large  discretion  and  good  judgment  but  also 
the  control  of  all  those  passions  and  propensi- 
ties of  man  in  which  are  to  be  found  much  of 
his  w^eakness  as  well  as  much  of  his  strength. 
Thus  it  seems  that  there  is  no  capacity,  faculty 
or  propensity  of  mind  that  is  not  directly  or 
indirectly  related  to  the  qualification  of  virtue. 

In  view  of  vv^hat  has  been  stated  there  ap- 
pears a  truth  which  although  generally  well 
known  seems  to  be  too  unw^elcome  to  be  ap- 


165 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

preciated  and  which  may  be  stated  in  general 
terms  thus: 

No  man  contains  within  him- 
self to  any  notable  extent  that  just 
and  proportionate  combination  of 
practical  knowledge,  discretion, 
judgment  and  virtue  w^hich  consti- 
tutes true  w^isdom. 

But  w^hile  this  is  true  of  the  human  indi- 
vidual it  is  not  necessarily  true  of  a  number  of 
men  taken  as  a  w^hole.  For,  there  are  men  of 
ample  knowledge,  others  of  fair  discretion, 
some  of  tolerable  judgment,  as  human  judg- 
ment goes,  and  all  of  these  may  have  some 
virtue.  And  there  are  certain  other  men  of  suf- 
ficient executive  ability  to  select,  classify  and 
organize  those  men  and  cause  them  to  co-ope- 
rate in  the  prosecution  and  completion  of  some 
good  and  important  purpose  and  thus  display, 
as  a  whole,  a  notable  degree  of  wisdom. 

166 


SIMPLE  AND  COMPOUND  WISDOM. 

Were  this  not  true  then  human  progress 
would  be  as  insignificant  as  the  wisdom  of  the 
individual,  but  that  it  is  true  is  shown  by  num- 
erous great  and  good  achievements  which 
otherwise  would  not  have  been  possible. 

Whence  two  propositions  must  be  true: 

1 .  The  w^isdom  of  the  human  indi- 
vidual cannot  be  great  and  at  its 
highest  limit  consists  of  executive 
ability  and  virtue  combined  with  a 
judgment  that  recognizes  its  own 
deficiencies  and  defers  to  the  best 
available  judgments  of  other  men. 

2.  The  w^isdom  of  man  in  general 
w^ith  its  qualities  existing  in  differ- 
ent men  but  properly  combined  by 
executive  ability  is  great  in  propor- 
tion to  the  knowledge  and  discretion 
of  the  individuals  and  to  the  judg- 
ment and  virtue  of  the  w^hole. 

From  the  explicit  definition  given  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  wisdom  of  every  man,  by  reason 
of  its  virtue,   naturally  prompts  him  to  the 

167 
-12- 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

achievement  of  every  good  purpose  w^ithin  the 
scope  of  his  abilities  and  opportunities. 

Therefore,  the  vsrisdom  of  any  man  must 
be  estimated  from  the  nature  and  practical  sig- 
nificance of  the  purposes  which  he  may  actual- 
ly have  achieved. 

Accordingly,  it  vsrill  be  assumed,  as  v^as 
done  in  treating  of  intellectual  efficiency,  that 
every  man  is  free  and  able  to  obtain  sufficient 
means  for  the  achievement  of  his  practicable 
purposes. 

Under  that  assumption  the  different  de- 
grees of  wrisdom  possessed  by  the  human  in- 
dividual may  be  exemplified  thus: 

The  common  laborer  w^ho  earns  an  hon- 

/  est  living  show^s  know^ledge  of  his  implements 

and  of  the  materials  upon  which  he  uses  them, 

discretion  in  their  use,  judgment  in  his  honesty 

of  purpose  and  virtue  by  his  industry  and  per- 

168 


MANIFESTATIONS  OF  WISDOM. 

sistence.  He,  therefore,  shows  some  wisdom 
which,  though  of  small  degree,  is  greater  than 
is  shown  by  him  w^ho  labors  not  at  all. 

The  artisan  who  makes  a  useful  piece  of 
/  mechanism  shows  knowledge  of  the  properties 
of  matter,  discretion  in  their  use  and  in  the 
states  of  law  and  order  shown  in  the  machine, 
judgment  in  its  value  and  utility  and  virtue  by 
the  conduct  and  completion  of  his  purpose. 
This  artisan  displays  more  know^ledge  and  dis- 
cretion, better  judgment,  greater  virtue  and, 
therefore,  a  higher  degree  of  wisdom  than  the 
common  laborer. 

The  man  of  affairs  who  organizes  artisans 
and  laborers  under  rules  and  regulations  so 
that  all  shall  work  together  and  by  proper 
measures  surely  bring  about  an  excellent  re- 
sult shows  knowledge  of  men  and  means,  dis- 
cretion by  the  prescription  and  enforcement  of 

169 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  rules,  judgment  in  the  nature  of  his  pur- 
pose and  virtue  by  its  laudable  achievement. 
Manifestly  such  a  man  displays  more  wisdom 
than  is  shown  by  any  artisan  or  laborer  work- 
ing under  him. 

Should  this  man  of  affairs  select  a  mana- 
ger of  sufficient  executive  ability  to  enforce  his 
rules  and  regulations  he  then,  in  so  far  as  he 
himself  might  be  concerned,  w^ould  have  es- 
tablished a  state  of  self-enforcing  law^  and  or- 
der to  which  he  might  entrust  the  ultimate  ac- 
complishment of  his  good  and  useful  object. 
Then,  should  he  by  repetition  of  this  process 
carry  forward  simultaneously  several  useful 
purposes  he  would  display  more  wisdom  than 
would  be  shown  by  any  manager  whom  he 
might  employ. 

Should  he  select  his  purposes  with  due 


170 


WISDOM  OF  THE  STATESMAN. 

regard  for  their  relations  to  each  other  and  or- 
ganize them  under  proper  regulations  so  that 
all  would  be  carried  forward  and  abreast  and 
finally  be  merged  into  a  single  and  proportion- 
ately great  and  good  result  he  would  show 
more  wisdom  than  the  man  who  might  achieve 
but  not  consolidate  those  purposes. 

The  statesmap/ who  serves  his  country- 
men and  by  precept  and  example  increases  the 
knowledge,  enhances  the  discretion,  improves 
the  judgment  and  stimulates  the  virtue  of  the 
citizen  in  conservation  of  the  present  state, 
shows  knowledge  by  his  precepts,  discretion 
by  his  influence,  judgment  by  the  nature  of  his 
purpose  and  virtue  by  his  conduct  and  exam- 
ple. He  thus  prevents  confusion  among  the 
purposes  of  many  different  men  and  makes 
possible  a  state  of  social  law^  and  order. 


171 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  the  statesman  who  prevents  confu- 
sion is  manifestly  not  so  wise  as  he  who  by 
prescription  and  enforcement  of  proper  rules 
of  order  causes  his  countrymen  to  correlate  all 
their  purposes  and  work  together  for  the  w^el- 
fare  and  progress  of  the  whole. 

And  w^iser  than  any  other  is  the  statesman 
w^ho  by  appealing  to  experience,  to  sensation 
and  to  thought  causes  salutary  rules  of  order 
to  carry  their  own  enforcement  w^ith  them  and 
thus  builds  up  a  comprehensive  state  of  self- 
enforcing  law  and  order  which  consolidates 
the  wisdom  of  many  men  in  the  achievement 
of  a  single  practical  purpose  of  great  and  in- 
creasing common  good. 

The  achievement  of  such  a  purpose  is  the 
end  and  aim  of  civilization  and  the  perfection 
of  civilization  is  recognized  as  the  highest  ideal 
of  human  wisdom. 

172 


HIGHEST  DEGREE  OF  HUMAN 
WISDOM. 

But  perfect  civilization  requires  a  com- 
prehensive code  of  salutary  rules  of  order  to 
each  and  every  one  of  which  every  man  must 
give  spontaneous  obedience. 

From  the  considerations  set  forth,  all  of 
which  are  confirmed  by  the  facts  of  history 
and  by  the  convictions  of  every  man  of  com- 
mon sense,  it  must  be  true  that: 

The  highest  possible  degree  of 
human  wisdom  is  that  which  must 
manifest  itself  in  the  best  and  great- 
est use,  through  self-enforcing  laws 
and  rules  of  order,  of  all  obtainable 
means  for  the  achievement  of  a  sin- 
gle good,  great  and  practical  pur- 
pose. 


h 


173 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

UNLIMITED  WISDOM. 

The  notion  that  the  universe  was  created 
and  is  governed  by  a  single  supernatural  Cause 
of  absolute  liberty,  infinite  powrer  and  unlim- 
ited wrisdom  is  understood  to  be  one  of  the 
greatest  of  human  conceptions. 

This  conception  is  sublimely  expressed 
by  the  Scriptural  passages: 

*'In  the  beginning  God  created 
the  heaven  and  the  earth." 

"The  Lord  by  w^isdom  hath 
founded  the  earth;  by  understand- 
ing hath  he  established  the  heav- 
ens. 

To   discover   the   practical  significance   of 

the  unlimited  wisdom  of  the  Creator  is  a  prob- 

174 


UNLIMITED  WISDOM. 

lem  that  has  enlisted  the  energies  of  the  theo- 
logians and  philosophers  of  every  enlightened 
age. 

It  seems  to  have  been  generally  under- 
stood that  two  kinds  of  wisdom  are  no  more 
possible  than  two  kinds  of  truth  and  that,  con- 
sequently, the  unlimited  wisdom  of  the  Deity 
differs  from  the  finite  w^isdom  of  man,  not  in 
kind  but  only  in  degree. 

This  is  recognized   and   expressed  in  the 

Scriptures  by  the  passage: 

**So  God  created  man  in  his 
ow^n  image;  In  the  image  of  God 
created  he  him;  male  and  female 
created  he  them." 

Therefore,  the  best  that  any  man  can  do 

is  to  assume  that  the  creative  and  governing 

Cause  with  absolute  liberty  and  infinite  power 

is  possessed,  to  the  highest  possible  degree,  of 

all  the  intellectual  qualifications  w^hich  consti- 

175 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

tute  the  wisdom  of  man  and  then  to  accept  the 
philosophical  consequences  which  may  be  de- 
veloped from  that  basis. 

Now,  it  has  been  shown  that  human  wis- 
dom is  a  combination  of  knowledge,  discretion, 

judgment  and  virtue  and  that: 

The  highest  possible  degree  of 
human  wisdom  is  that  which  must 
manifest  itself  in  the  best  and  great- 
est use,  through  self-enforcing  laws 
and  rules  of  order,  of  all  obtainable 
means  for  the  achievement  of  a  sin- 
gle good,  great  and  practical  pur- 
pose. 

Whence  for  reasons  stated,  and  in  so  far  as 
man  is  able  to  determine: 

The  unlimited  wisdom  of  a 
creative  and  governing  Cause  of  ab- 
solute liberty  and  infinite  power  w^ill 
manifest  itself  by  the  prosecution  of 
a  single  definite  purpose  illimitably 
good  and  great,  in  the  achievement 
of  which  all  causes  wrill  have  the 
greatest  possible  scope  under  a  per- 
fect state  of  self-enforcing  Law  and 
Order. 

176 


PRIMORDIAL  PROPOSITIONS. 

This  being  understood,  there  may  be  es- 
tablished by  means  of  the  explicit  definition 
given  of  the  Wisdom  of  Man  the  following 
primordial  propositions: 

1 .  Before  the  beginning  of  organ- 
ized existence  there  must  have  been 
formed  a  single  definite  purpose  il- 
limitably  good  and  great. 

For,  other^rise  the  virtue  of  the  creative 
Cause  w^ould  have  been  deficient  and  unlim- 
ited w^isdom  wrould  not  have  been  possible. 

2.  Causes  necessary  for  the  great 
purpose  must  either  have  existed  in 
the  beginning  or  must  have  been 
created. 

For,   w^ere  this  not   true  then   the  virtue   of 

the  creative  Cause  of  infinite  power  w^ould 

have  been  limited. 

3.  The  greatest  possible  scope 
must  have  been  given  to  all  avail- 
able causes  under  perfect  self-en- 
forcing principles,  laws  and  rules  of 
order. 

177 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

For  otherwise,  certain  causes  would  not 
be  subject  to  systematic  control  and  an  illimit- 
able definite  purpose  might  be  impracticable. 

4.  In  the  beginning  every  corpo- 
real, vital  and  intellectual  entity 
must  have  been  in  the  crudest  possi- 
ble state  consistent  w^ith  mere  exist- 
ence. 

For,    w^ere   this   not   true   then   all    available 

causes  would  not  have  been  given  the  greatest 

possible  scope. 

5.  All  events  necessary  for  the  il- 
limitable definite  purpose  must  duly 
and  surely  come  to  pass  and  no  oth- 
ers must  be  possible. 

For,  any  event  less  w^ould  make  the  total 
insufficient,  any  additional  would  transcend 
the  illimitable  purpose  and  any  arbitrary  act 
or  relation  would  mean  a  defect  in  some  prin- 
ciple, law  or  rule  of  order  which  might  destroy 
all  definite  relation  and  bring  about  confusion. 


178 


PHENOMENA  OF  EXISTENCE. 

Those  five  propositions,  taken  altogether, 
mean  that  in  order  that  any  hypothesis  of  a 
creative  and  governing  Cause  of  absolute  lib- 
erty, infinite  power  and  unlimited  wisdom 
may  be  sustained  it  must  be  true  that: 

The  dominion  of  self-enforc- 
ing Lawr  and  Order  is  absolute  and 
unconditional. 

The  extent  to  which  the  hypothesis  of  a 
single  Cause  of  unlimited  w^isdom  accords  w^ith 
the  observed  phenomena  of  existence  may  be 
indicated  generally  thus: 

The  orderly  progress  of  events  and  the 
apparent  states  of  Law  and  Order  that  prevail 
among  them  all  suggest  intelligent  purpose 
and  control;  the  general  welfare  and  progress 
of  mankind  indicate  the  purpose  to  be  good 
and  the  tremendous  and  incessant  action  of  ex- 
istence denotes  that  it  is  great. 

179 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

That  existence  contains  adequate  means 
for  achievement  of  a  definite  purpose  illimit- 
ably  good  and  great  is  indicated  by  the  abund- 
ance and  diversity  of  existing  causes,  by  their 
actual  and  potential  energies  and  by  the  mani- 
fold and  marvelous,  beneficial  and  efficient  re- 
lations that  are  known  to  prevail  among  them 
all. 

That  every  entity  w^as,  at  the  beginning, 
in  the  crudest  possible  state  and  that,  conse- 
quently, all  causes  then  had  the  greatest  con- 
ceivable scope  is  shown  in  all  departments  of 
existence: 

In  Corporeal  Existence: 

By  vvrhat  is  know^n  to  have  been  the  orig- 
inal state  of  matter  in  which  apparent  confu- 
sion was  flagrant  and  extreme.  This  naturally 
gave  to  mechanical  and  to  chemical  energies 
the  greatest  possible  range  of  operation. 

180 


ORIGINAL  CRUDITY. 

In  Vital  Existence: 

By  the  low  forms  of  vitality  under  which 
plants  and  animals  made  their  first  appearance 
on  the  earth  and  by  which,  at  the  beginning, 
vital  energies  were  given  the  widest  imagin- 
able range. 

In  Intellectual  Existence: 

By  the  ignorance,  superstition,  immor- 
ality, cruelty,  injustice  and  general  depravity 
which  characterized  the  conduct  of  man  dur- 
ing the  early  stages  of  his  career  and  of  which 
there  are  innumerable  conspicuous  instances 
at  the  present  time.  It  is  manifest  that  this 
state  of  mind,  so  productive  of  evil,  cannot  be 
justified  except  by  the  predominance  of  good 
purposes  and  by  the  consideration  that  other- 
wise the  intellectual  energies  of  man  could  not 
have  been  given  their  greatest  and  most  effi- 
cient scope. 

181 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

That  all  existing  causes  and  their  ener- 
gies are  subject  entirely  to  perfect  self -enforc- 
ing Law  and  Order  is  indicated  everywhere 
without  exception: 

In  Corporeal  Existence: 

By  the  systematic  processes  through 
which  it  has  been  brought  from  chaos  to  its 
present  magnificent  state  of  progressive  devel- 
opment by  corporeal  energies  acting  according 
to  self-enforcing  mechanical  and  chemical 
laws. 

In  Vital  Existence: 

By  the  gradual  and  orderly  progress  of 
vegetable  and  animal  life  from  the  lowest  to 
the  highest  forms  by  vital  energies  acting  un- 
der the  self-enforcing  laws  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion and  by  the  marvelous  relations  among 
such  forms  as  well  as  between  the  phenomena 
of  organic  and  inorganic  existence. 

182 


UNIVERSAL  LAW  AND  ORDER. 

In  Intellectual  Existence: 

By  the  gradual  advancement  of  knowl- 
edge from  the  lowest  possible  condition  by  in- 
tellectual energies  impelled  by  natural  causes 
and  directed  by  self-enforcing  laws  of  sensa- 
tion, thought  and  emotion.  Also,  by  the  sys- 
tematic elevation  of  moral  and  religious  ideals 
from  abject  depravity  through  the  wronderful 
self-enforcing,  natural  and  ultimate  predomi- 
nance of  the  good  over  the  evil. 
In  Existence  Generally: 

By  the  manifold  relations  among  phe- 
nomena w^idely  different  in  kind,  w^hich  rela- 
tions might  not  exist  and  apparently  need  not 
prevail  did  they  not  contribute  to  a  perfect 
state  of  self-enforcing  universal  Law^  and  Or- 
der subject  to  no  arbitrary  change  and  admit- 
ting of  no  interference.  Also,  by  the  condi- 
tion that  among  all  the  countless  observations 

183 

-13  - 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  discoveries  of  Philosophy  and  Science 
there  is  not  the  shghtest  conclusive  evidence 
that  any  event  has  ever  happened  vv^hich  did 
not  come  to  pass  in  strict  accordance  w^ith  self- 
enforcing  Law  and  Order. 

Whence,  it  may  be  affirmed  that : 

All  phenomena  of  existence  are  in  full 
accord  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  single  Cause 
of  unlimited  wisdom. 

Therefore,  Wisdom,  in  w^hatsoever  sub- 
stance it  may  inhere  and  to  whatsoever  extent 
it  may  exist,  must  sustain  to  purpose  and  to 
self-enforcing  Law  and  Order  the  following 
general  relations: 

1 .       The  greater  the  wisdom   the 
greater  must  be  the  best  and  great- 
est possible  purpose. 

For,  wisdom  without  a  corresponding  pos- 
sible purpose  would  be  unable  to  express  its 
full  practical  significance. 

184 


RELATIONS  OF  WISDOM, 

2.  The  greater  the  wisdom  the 
more  abundant  and  diverse  must  be 
the  means  available  for  systematic 
achievement. 

For,  the  degree  of  v^isdom  depends  upon 
the  extent  and  diversity  of  the  means  it  actual- 
ly and  successfully  applies. 

3.  The  greater  the  v^isdom  the 
greater  must  be  the  state  of  self -en- 
forcing Law  and  Order  which  can 
be  established  and  maintained. 

For  otherwise,  the  systematic  achieve- 
ment of  the  best  and  greatest  purpose  might 
fail  from  want  of  proper  method. 

4.  The  greater  the  wisdom  the 
greater  is  the  state  of  self-enforcing 
Law  and  Order  which  it  must  estab- 
lish and  maintain. 

For  wisdom,  by  reason  of  its  virtue,  re- 
quires the  best  and  greatest  use  of  all  available 
means  and  this  is  practicable  only  through  self- 
enforcing  laws  and  rules  of  order. 

185 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

If  the  All-powerful,  All-wise  Cause  has 
no  being  then,  in  view^  of  what  has  been  stated 
concerning  the  phenomena  of  existence,  hu- 
man w^isdom  itself  must  be  the  effect  of  natural 
causes  and  it  must  be  conceded  that: 

All  events  must  come  to  pass 
according  to  self-enforcing  law  and 
order. 

This  means  that  for  all  the  causes,  effects 

and  events  endurable  by  man  as  the  possessor 

of  finite  w^isdom  and  dependent  entirely  upon 

his  own  achievements  for  advancement  of  his 

welfare,  two  conditions  must  prevail: 

1 .  That  which  can  happen  in  the 
course  of  self-enforcing  law  and  or- 
der w^ill  not  come  to  pass  in  any 
other  way. 

2.  That  which  can  not  hap- 
pen in  the  course  of  self-enforcing 
law  and  order  will  not  come  to  pstss 
at  all. 

For,   did  not  these   conditions   prevail   there 
would  be  no  adequate  basis  for  the  system- 

186 


PHILOSOPHICAL  CONSEQUENCES. 

atic  achievement  of  any  purpose  and  human 

wisdom  would  be  impossible. 

Again,  it  has  been  shown  that  under  any 

hypothesis  of  a  single  All-powerful,  All-wise 

creative  and  governing  Cause: 

The  dominion  of  self-enforcing 
law^  and  order  must  be  absolute  and 
unconditional. 

This  means  that  for  all  possible  causes, 
conditions,  effects  and  events  three  proposi- 
tions must  be  true: 

1 .  That  which  can  happen  in 
the  course  of  self -enforcing  law  and 
order  will  not  come  to  pass  in  any 
other  way. 

2.  That  which  cannot  hap- 
pen in  the  course  of  self-enforcing 
law^  and  order  cannot  come  to  pass 
at  all. 

3.  Everything  that  can  hap- 
pen in  the  course  of  self-enforcing 
lawr  and  order  w^ill  surely  come  to 
pass. 

For,   were  these  propositions   not  true  then 

187 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

there  would  be  no  adequate  basis  for  the  sys- 
tematic achievement  of  a  single  definite  pur- 
pose inimitably  good  and  great  and  the  exer- 
cise of  unlimited  wisdom  w^ould  be  impossible. 
And  that  they  are  true  is  indicated  without 
exception  by  all  the  phenomena  of  existence 
known  and  understood  by  man. 

The  magnificent  state  of  self-enforcing 
Law^  and  Order  w^hich  prevails  throughout  the 
phenomena  of  corporeal,  vital  and  intellectual 
existence  not  only  makes  human  w^isdom  pos- 
sible but  gives  to  man  the  means  and  opportu- 
nity for  continual  addition  to  the  wisdom  that 
is  in  him.  It  thus  enables  man  not  only  to  sus- 
tain but  also  to  accelerate  the  systematic  ad- 
vancement of  his  welfare. 

In  addition  to  this  it  must  be  admitted 
that  it  was   through    the   contemplation    and 


188 


BENEFICIAL  CONSEQUENCES. 

progressive  appreciation  of  this  great  state  of 
universal  lavsr  and  order  that  man  wras  gradu- 
ally brought  to  the  conception  of  a  single  crea- 
tive and  governing  Cause  with  liberty,  power 
and  wisdom  transcending  all  conceivable  lim- 
itations ;  w^hich  conception  in  its  higher  practi- 
cal applications  under  the  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tian Religion  has  done  so  much  to  promote  the 
co-operation  of  men  for  general  advancement 
of  human  wrelfare.  And  history  indicates  that 
without  that  great  conception  man  could  never 
have  advanced  through  certain  stages  of  intel- 
lectual, moral  and  spiritual  development  and 
that  even  though  it  does  involve  inconceivable 
causes  and  conditions  and  even  though  it  may 
not  be  true  it  has  contributed  as  much  to  hu- 
man welfare  and  progress  as  established  fact 
and  demonstrated  truth. 


189 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

GENERAL  CONCLUSION. 

In  view  of  all  that  has  been  set  forth  con- 
cerning Purpose,  Law  and  Order,  Means  and 
Method,  Intellectual  Efficiency  and  Wisdom  it 
seems  clear  that: 

Under  an  adequate  conception  of  Wis- 
dom the  findings  of  Practical  Philosophy  are 
in  substantial  accord  with  the  hypothesis  of  a 
single  supernatural  Cause  of  absolute  liberty, 
infinite  power  and  unlimited  w^isdom  until  that 
transcendental  doctrine  reaches  the  confines 
of  conceivable  existence  and  passes  out  into 
the  Great  Unknown. 


190 


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'^PK     7   1933 
DBC  19  1933 

NOV  1    1934 
APR    8  1936 


m   20  193l> 


NOV  7  ]m^ 
l6May'57PVv' 


FEB     8  1944 
^PR  19  1946 


REC'O  LD 


LD  21-50m-l. 


YC  30786 


/• 


/. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  LIBRARY 


